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CRIMINAL MINDS: THE NEED TO REFINE
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
OBJECTIVE CHANCES AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
INTRODUCING UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT
EVIDENCE TO PROVE INTENT
Edward J. Imwinkelried*
[T]here is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so.
- William Shakespeare
I.

INTRODUCTION

Dean Wigmore once wrote that the hearsay doctrine is the "most
characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of Evidence." 2 Today, it
can be said that the character evidence doctrine is the most characteristic
rule of American evidence law. At early common law, a proponent could
not introduce evidence of an accused's uncharged crime in order to show
the accused's bad character and, in turn, treat that character as proof that
the accused committed the charged crime.' Modernly, most legal
systems in the common law world have significantly relaxed that
prohibition.' However, with few exceptions,' the evidentiary codes in

&

* Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Davis; former
chair, Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; author, Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2., 11. 249-50 (Harold Jenkins ed., Methuen
Co. Ltd. 1982).
2.

5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE

IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
3.

§ 1364

(3d ed. 1940).

See 1 KENNETH S. BROUN ETAL., MCCORMICKON EVIDENCE §§ 186-190 (7th ed. 2013).

4. See Felicity Gerry et al., Patternsof Sexual Behaviour: The Law of Evidence: Back to the
Future in Australia andEngland, INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, Dec. 2013, at 29, 56.
5. E.g., FED. R. EviD. 413(a), 414(a), 415(a) (abolishing the prohibition selectively in
criminal and civil cases involving allegations of sexual assault and child molestation). These rules
have been sharply criticized:
The federal rules . . .presuppose that sex offenders are uniquely inclined to high rates of
recidivism even though the empirical evidence suggests otherwise . . . . [Sipecial rules of
admissibility should be strongly supported by empirical or other evidence and ... this
standard has not been met in the case of Rules 413 and 414. The special rules of
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the United States firmly maintain the prohibition.' For example, Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides: "Evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character."' Thus, at an armed robbery trial, the prosecution may not
introduce evidence of a prior, uncharged robbery by the accused simply
to show that the accused is a robber and hence more likely to have
perpetrated the charged robbery.
However, the wording of Rule 404(b)(1) should not mislead the
reader into believing that the prosecution may never introduce evidence
of an accused's uncharged offenses. Quite the contrary is true. Another
subsection of the very same rule reads: "This evidence may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or
lack of accident."' This provision generates more appellate litigation and
published opinions than any other section in the Rules.9 Rule 404(b)(2)
permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of an accused's uncharged
misconduct when the evidence is logically relevant on a non-character
theory."o Prosecutors frequently offer uncharged misconduct under Rule
404(b)(2) because they appreciate that its introduction can have a

admissibility reflected in Rules 413 and 414 are unsound ....
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & ERIN E. MURPHY, MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
RELATED OFFENSES: DISCUSSION DRAFT No. 2, at 234-35 (2015).

6. It is understandable that the United States takes the character prohibition so seriously. In
Robinson v. California,the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment forbids status offenses. 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); see Joel v. City of Orlando, 232
F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 2000). Hence, while in most of the common law world it offends a
recognized policy if the accused is punished for being a recidivist, in the United States that policy
has been elevated to constitutional status.

7. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(1).
8. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(2).
9. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013) ("Rule 404(b) has become the
most cited evidentiary rule on appeal."); State v. Johns, 725 P.2d 312, 317 (Or. 1986) (noting that,
in the mid-1980s, a Westlaw search of the relevant key numbers identified 11,607 state cases);
Thomas J. Reed, Admitting the Accused's Criminal History: The Trouble with Rule 404(b), 78
TEMP. L. REV. 201, 211 (2005) ("Since 1975, Rule 404(b) has been the most contested Federal Rule
of Evidence. It has been cited in 5,603 federal trial and appellate decisions since adoption. No other
evidentiary rule comes close to this rule as a breeder of issues for appeals."); Paul Mark Sandler,
Litigator's Bookshelf Trial Tactics by Stephen Saltzburg, LITIG., Winter 2009, at 57, 58 (book
review) (discussing Rule 404(b) as "the most highly discussed federal rule of evidence"); Byron N.
Miller, Note, Admissibility of Other Offense Evidence After State v. Houghton, 25 S.D. L. REV. 166,
167 (1980) ("Admissability of evidence of other acts, wrongs, or crimes is the most frequently
litigated question of evidence at the appellate level .... ). See generally David P. Leonard, The Use
of UnchargedMisconduct Evidence to Prove Knowledge, 81 NEB. L. REV. 115 (2002) (extensively
discussing Rule 404(b) litigations).
10. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(2).
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devastating impact on the defense." Suppose, for example, that the
accused is charged with an armed robbery committed on March 1. When
the perpetrator fled the scene, he dropped a pistol with a certain serial
number. The prosecutor has evidence that on February 1, the accused
stole that very pistol from a gun store. At the armed robbery trial, Rule
404(b)(2) would enable the prosecutor to introduce testimony about the
February 1 theft for the purpose of identifying the accused as the
perpetrator of the March 1 charged offense. In this situation, the
prosecutor is not arguing simplistically that the earlier, uncharged theft
shows the accused is a criminal and, therefore, more likely to have
committed the charged robbery; rather, the prosecutor is relying on the
non-character theory that by virtue of the prior theft, the accused gained
possession of a unique, one-of-a-kind instrumentality found at the scene
of the charged robbery. It is true that here the evidence has dual
relevance: It is probative on a forbidden character theory as well as a
legitimate non-character theory. However, in most cases of dual
relevance, the judge admits the evidence and gives the jury a limiting
instruction under Rule 105.12 The instruction directs the jury that
although they may not use the evidence to infer the accused's bad
character, they may consider the evidence for the limited purpose of
deciding whether the accused was the person who wielded the pistol
during the charged March 1 robbery.
As the preceding hypothetical illustrates, prosecutors sometimes
introduce uncharged misconduct to prove the accused's identity as the
perpetrator of the charged offense. However, as the wording of Rule
404(b)(2) indicates, prosecutors may offer uncharged misconduct
evidence to establish other elements of the charged crime such as the
mens rea, the requisite "intent." As a matter of history, offering such
evidence to prove mens rea elements was "[t]he earliest widely
recognized use of uncharged misconduct evidence."" Today, the
introduction of uncharged misconduct to prove intent is the most
common use of Rule 404(b) evidence.14 It is understandable why
prosecutors resort to this use of uncharged misconduct so frequently. In
11. See United States v. Hawpetoss, 478 F.3d 820, 822, 826 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting the
defense argument that the evidence produces the reaction "game over" in the eyes of the jury);
People v. Smallwood, 722 P.2d 197, 205 (Cal. 1986) (acknowledging that evidence of other crimes
is "the most prejudicial evidence imaginable against an accused"); 1 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE

§ 1:02

(2009).

12.
13.

FED. R. EVID. 105.
Leonard, supra note 9, at 118.

14.

22B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 5242 (Supp. 2016); see Thomas J. Reed, The Development of the Propensity Rule in
FederalCriminal Causes 1840-1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 306-07 (1982).
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many cases, prosecutors can rely on physical evidence or eyewitness
testimony to establish both the occurrence of a crime and the accused's
identity as the perpetrator. For example, the victim or a percipient
witness may provide direct evidence of the accused's identity. The proof
of the mens rea often proves to be the most difficult challenge for the
prosecutor," especially in prosecutions for white-collar crimes.16 Unless
the accused has made a confession directly admitting mens rea, the
prosecution must almost always rely on circumstantial evidence."
The courts appreciate how difficult it can be for a prosecutor to
establish the accused's criminal intent, and they consequently are
generally rather liberal in permitting the prosecution to introduce
uncharged misconduct evidence for that purpose.1 8 Most courts take a
19
lenient attitude toward the admission of such evidence to prove intent.
Given the right circumstances, the prosecution may introduce uncharged
misconduct to prove the accused's identity as the perpetrator, the
accused's formation of a plan to commit the charged and uncharged
crimes, or the accused's mens rea; 20 and, the introduction of the evidence
for any of these purposes may necessitate a showing of a degree of
similarity between the charged and uncharged crimes. The courts
routinely assert that the lowest degree of similarity is required when the
prosecution offers the evidence to prove intent.2
In the final analysis, in many cases in which the courts accept
"similar" uncharged misconduct evidence under Rule 404(b) to show
intent, they rely-at least implicitly-on Dean Wigmore's famous
doctrine of objective chances; on the facts, there is no other applicable
non-character theory. Wigmore stated the doctrine of chances in his
monumental evidence treatise:

15. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 133-36. Although you can see a face or a knife, you cannot
directly perceive another person's state of mind. See id. at 124-28, 169.
16. See Abbe David Lowell, Fighting the 'Presumption of Guilt,' 24 NAT'L L.J., June 10,
2002, at D8, D8.
17. See Leonard, supranote 9, at 124-25.
18.

See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14,

§ 5239.

19. See Leonard, supranote 9, at 132-33.
20. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(2).
21. United States v. Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[A] much lower degree of
similarity is required to prove a state of mind than to prove identity."); People v. Johnson, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 505, 515 (Ct. App. 2013) (requiring "[t]he least degree of similarity" to prove intent
(quoting People v. Foster, 242 P.3d 105, 131 (Cal. 2010))); see also People v. Harris, 306 P.3d
1195, 1226 (Cal. 2013); People v. Jones, 247 P.3d 82, 102 (Cal. 2011); People v. Carpenter, 935
P.2d 708, 745 (Cal. 1997), abrogatedon other grounds by People v. Diaz, 345 P.3d 62 (Cal. 2015);
People v. Escudero, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 758, 766 (Ct. App. 2010); People v. Tapia, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
851, 871 (Ct. App. 1994).
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The argument here is . .. from the point of view of the doctrine of
chances,-the instinctive recognition of that logical process which
eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying instances of
the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot explain
them all. . . . [T]he mind applies this rough and instinctive process of
reasoning, namely, that an unusual and abnormal element might
perhaps be present in one instance, but the oftener similar instances
occur with similar results, the less likely is the abnormal element likely
to be the true explanation of them.
Thus, if A while hunting with B hears the bullet from B's gun
whistling past his head, he is willing to accept B's bad aim or
B's accidental tripping as a conceivable explanation; but if shortly
afterwards the same thing happens again, and if on the third
occasion A receives B's bullet in his body, the . . . inference (i.e.
as a probability, perhaps not a certainty) is that B shot at A
deliberately; ... the chances of an inadvertent shooting on three
successive similar occasions are extremely small ....
Ian Fleming captured the same notion in a classic line from his James
Bond novel, Goldfinger: "Once is happenstance. Twice is coincidence.
The third time it's enemy action." 23
The conventional wisdom is that the admission of uncharged
misconduct to prove intent on this theory is a legitimate non-character
theory of logical relevance. As previously stated, Rule 404(b) forbids
the prosecution from introducing testimony about an accused's
uncharged misconduct to show the accused's personal, subjective 24
disposition or propensity for illegal or immoral conduct.25 In theory, the
doctrine of chances has nothing to do with the accused's character.26
Instead, to apply the doctrine, the trier of fact focuses on the objective
improbability of so many accidental, inadvertent occurrences.2 7 To
be sure, innocent persons sometimes find themselves enmeshed in
suspicious circumstances; but common sense indicates that it is
implausible that such involvement will occur repeatedly.
Although the courts now accept the doctrine of chances as an
alternative, non-character theory of logical relevance, reliance on the
doctrine poses significant probative dangers. As previously stated,
22. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 302.
23. IAN FLEMING, GOLDFINGER 123 (1959), quoted in Stephen E. Fienberg & D. H. Kaye,
Legal and Statistical Aspects of Some Mysterious Clusters, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. Soc'Y 61, 61

(1991).

§ 2:19.

24.

IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11,

25.

Id.

26.

Nancy Bauer, Casenote, People v. Spoto: Teasing the Defense on Prior Bad Acts

Evidence, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 783, 803-04 (1992).
27.

IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11,

§ 5:06.
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uncharged misconduct evidence almost always possesses dual relevance;
even when it is logically relevant on a non-character theory, the evidence
also shows the accused's bad propensity and creates the risk that the trier
will misuse the evidence for the verboten character purpose.2 8 The line
between proper non-character reasoning and improper character
reasoning is a fine one.29 It can be a very thin distinction for the lay
jurors to draw during deliberations.30 Again, to trigger the doctrine, the
prosecutor must demonstrate that the charged and uncharged crimes are
similar." The very similarity of the crimes can sorely tempt the jury to
succumb to the character-reasoning syndrome. 32 It is axiomatic that the
jurors may not reason that the other act shows the accused's bad
character and that "if he did it once, he did it again." However, there is
an acute risk that the line between that forbidden theory and the doctrine
of chances will blur33 during deliberations, when the jury has to assess
the similarity between the charged and uncharged acts. If the judge
decides to admit uncharged misconduct on a doctrine of chances theory,
it is his or her responsibility to ensure that the theory does not function
as a Potemkin, virtually inviting the jury to engage in forbidden
character reasoning.3 4
The thesis of this Article is that in many cases, the courts have
shirked that responsibility. The next Part addresses the threshold
question of whether the character prohibition has any application when
the prosecution offers uncharged misconduct evidence to show mens
rea.35 Although some have suggested that the answer is no, Part II
concludes that the prohibition applies with full force whether the
evidence is offered to show mens rea or physical conduct.36 Part III is
largely descriptive, reviewing the doctrine of chances. The Part lists the
requirements for invoking the doctrine and explains why the courts have
concluded that the doctrine is a legitimate, non-character theory.37
28.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

29. United States v. Derington, 229 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000); see State v. Brown, 900
A.2d 1155, 1160, 1163-64 (RI. 2006).
30. See United States v. Bass, 794 F.2d 1305, 1313 (8th Cir. 1986).
31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32. State v. Newton, 743 P.2d 254, 256 (Wash. 1987) (en banc); Victor J. Gold, Limiting
JudicialDiscretion to Exclude PrejudicialEvidence, 18 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 59, 68-71, 80 (1984);
see Anne F. Curtin, Note, Limiting the Use of Prior Bad Acts and Convictions to Impeach the

Defendant-Witness, 45 ALB. L. REv. 1099, 1104 (1981).
33.

Daniel D. Blinka, Character, Liberalism, and the Protean Culture of Evidence Law, 37

SEATTLE U. L. REv. 87, 110-11 (2013).
34. United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008).
35. See infra Part II.
36. See infra Part I.B.
37. See infra Part III.
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The fourth and final Part is evaluative. The initial Subpart surveys
the current judicial administration of the character evidence prohibition
in cases in which the prosecution must turn to the doctrine of chances to
justify introducing uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent." It
demonstrates that in a large number of cases in which the courts admit
uncharged misconduct to establish intent and the prosecution's only
conceivable non-character theory is the doctrine of chances, the court's
analysis is conclusory in the extreme.39 Rather than invoking the
doctrine and inquiring whether the prosecution has satisfied the
doctrine's requirements, the courts advance the broad generalization that
similar misdeeds are admissible to prove intent.40 Even in the cases in
which the doctrine's technical requirements are satisfied, many courts do
little to ensure that the jury focuses on the objective improbability of
multiple, similar inadvertent acts rather than engaging in forbidden
character reasoning.4 1 In particular, the appellate courts have not
mandated that trial judges read the jury limiting instructions specifically
tailored to the doctrine of chances.4 2
The next Subpart proposes reforming the manner in which the
courts apply the doctrine. Under this proposal, when the prosecution
invokes the doctrine to rationalize the admission of uncharged
misconduct evidence to prove intent, the judge would have to (1)
explicitly determine that the evidence satisfies the doctrine's
requirements, and (2) administer limiting instructions specially tailored
to the doctrine.4 3 If the prosecution's foundation does not satisfy the
doctrine's requirements, the judge should certainly not rely on the
doctrine as the non-character justification for admitting the evidence."
In any event, the distinction between verboten character reasoning and
legitimate use of the doctrine can be so thin that the trial judge ought to
give the jury a limiting instruction sharply differentiating between
character reasoning and the use of the evidence according to the
doctrine. As we have seen, in criminal practice, Rule 404(b) is the most
frequently litigated evidentiary issue; and even more to the point, the
most common use of Rule 404(b) evidence is to prove intent. Given
those realities, the lax practices currently followed in many, if not most,
jurisdictions, are intolerable.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

W.A.
IV.A.1.
W.A. 1.
IV.A.2.
IV.A.2.
I.B.
I.B.
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II.

THE THRESHOLD QUESTION: DOES THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE
PROHIBITION APPLY WHEN THE PROSECUTION OFFERS UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE ACCUSED'S MENTAL STATE
OF MIND RATHER THAN PHYSICAL CONDUCT?

A.

The ProbativeDangersThat Account for the CharacterProhibition

Rule 404(b)(1) codifies an aspect of the character evidence
prohibition. By its terms, the rule forbids the prosecution from
introducing uncharged misconduct evidence "to [prove] that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with" a character or
trait for unlawful or immoral conduct.4 5 When the federal drafters
prepared the original Rule 404, they used section 1101 from the
California Evidence Code as a model. 46 The wording of section 1101(b)
is strikingly similar to that of Rule 404(b). There are slight linguistic
differences, but the thrust of the two statutes is essentially identical.
While Rule 404(b) refers to "act[ion]" in accordance with the character
or trait, section 1101 uses the expression, "conduct." 47 A narrow reading
of the statutory language might support the contention that the
prohibition comes into play only when the prosecution offers the
uncharged misconduct to show the accused's physical conduct, not his
or her mental intention. Indeed, in one case the California Supreme
Court stressed the legislature's choice of the word, "conduct." 48 Seizing
on that word choice, the court suggested that the prohibition was
inapplicable because "[t]he prosecutor [had] offered the evidence to
prove defendant's state of mind ... rather than defendant's conduct on
any particular occasion." 49
That suggestion is unsound. Figure 1, below, depicts the character
evidence prohibition. As we shall now see, the policy rationale for the
character evidence prohibition is that a character rationale poses a
combination of two significant dangers; and the use of uncharged
misconduct to prove an accused's intent raises both of those dangers.

45. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(1).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note. The note expressly cites the California
Law Revision Commission report discussing California's codification of the doctrine. Id.; see also
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 law revision commission cmt. (West 2009); CAL. LAW REVISION
COMM'N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF
EVIDENCE 615 (1964), http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/Printed-Reports/Pub054.pdf.

47. Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(1), with CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a).
48. People v. Bittaker, 774 P.2d 659, 688 (Cal. 1989).
49. Id.
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FIGURE 1
ITEM OF EVIDENCE
Uncharged act by
)
the accused

INTERMEDIATE INFERENCE
The accused's personal,
subjective bad character

)

ULTIMATE INFERENCE
The accused's conduct on the
charged occasion consistent
with the bad character

A character theory of logical relevance involves two inferential
steps, and each inference poses a significant probative danger. The first
step is the inference from the item of evidence to the intermediate
inference of the accused's personal, subjective bad character.so This
inference poses the danger that the jury will convict the accused on an
improper basis, namely, his or her criminal past. In order to decide
whether to draw this inference, the jury must consciously focus on the
question of whether the accused is the type of person who would commit
a crime. If the jury is forced to do so at a conscious level, there is a
substantial risk that, at least at a subconscious level, the jury will be
repulsed by the accused's criminal past." The Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment provision bars criminalizing a person's status. 52
If the jury were to convict due to the accused's past, not because of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offense, the conviction
would not only be on an improper basis; the conviction would also
offend a policy of constitutional dimension.
The second step in Figure 1 is the inference from the accused's bad
character to the conclusion that on the occasion of the charged offense,
the accused acted "in character" and perpetrated the charged offense
(similar to the charged crime).53 This step creates the danger that the jury
will overvalue the evidence.54 Most of the available psychological
research points to the conclusion that the general construct of a person's
character is a weak predictor of the person's conduct on a specific
occasion." In particular, it is difficult to find any published research that
would support drawing an inference as to the person's character from a
single other instance of the person's conduct."
50. Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Evidentiary Paradox: Defending the CharacterEvidence
Prohibitionby Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, the Doctrine of Chances,
40 U. RICH. L. REv. 419,426-27 (2006).
51. IMWINKELRIED, supranote 11, § 2:19.
52. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
53. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 2:19.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the "Grotesque" Doctrine of CharacterEvidence:
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The Presence of Those ProbativeDangers When the Prosecution
Offers UnchargedMisconduct Evidence to Prove Intent

This use of uncharged misconduct undeniably poses the first
probative danger. Evidence of an accused's other misconduct is
potentially prejudicial because the jury may perceive the conduct as
immoral57 and then be tempted to punish the accused for that
misconduct-not because the accused is guilty of the charged crime. For
the most part, it is the accused's wrongful intent that gives the conduct
its perceived immoral quality. As Shakespeare observed, "[T]here
is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so."" As one
article states:
When a writer wants to express the thought that a person has a criminal
disposition, the writer frequently describes the person as a "criminal
mind"-rather than a criminal arm or leg. Suppose that the jury
concludes that the accused has a warped mind inclined to criminal
intent. That conclusion can cause the jurors to experience the very type
of revulsion which the character evidence prohibition is designed to
guard against. As Judge Goldberg . . noted [in one of the most famous
Rule 404(b) decisions], the "character" referred to in Rule 404(b)
is "largely a concept of a person's psychological bent or frame
of mind. . . ."59
If the uncharged misconduct evidence tends to show that the accused has
a perverse mindset, a lay juror may be inclined to believe that whether
the accused is innocent or guilty of the charged crime, the accused needs
to be incarcerated to protect society.
Like the first probative danger inspiring the character evidence
prohibition, the second danger can be present when the prosecution
The Reform Implications of the Most Recent PsychologicalResearch, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 741, 761
(2008) (explaining that in the studies attempting to infer character from a single instance of conduct,
the accuracy rate was "at best .30" and that there does not appear to be a single published study
concluding that it is possible to accurately predict a person's conduct based on a single other
instance of the person's conduct); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape
Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 387, 495 (1996) ("Of
considerable concern is the fact that [the Rule] ignores the empirical data, which require a wider
range of behavior than a single prior incident of wrongful conduct, and a closer match between the
earlier situations and the present one, for prior acts to be predictive of current ones.").
57. Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts
Evidence, 66 IOWA L. REv. 777, 795-96 (1981).
58.

SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1.

59. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Use of Evidence of an Accused's UnchargedMisconduct to
Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten to Engulf the CharacterEvidence Prohibition,51
OHIO ST. L.J. 575, 583 (1990) (quoting United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 921 (5th Cir.
1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)) (citing PHILIP Q. ROCHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND (1958); Don J.
DeBenedictis, CriminalMinds, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 30).
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offers uncharged misconduct evidence to establish the accused's intent.
As Subpart A notes, above, the second inference poses the risk that the
jurors will ascribe undue weight to the accused's character as a predictor
of conduct on a specific occasion, that is, at the time of the alleged
commission of the charged crime.60 How much probative value does the
uncharged misconduct have to establish the accused's character as a
predictor of conduct at the time of the charged crime? That probative
value can be minimal:
If the only question were the accused's physical response [in the
charged and uncharged incidents], to some extent the resolution of the
question would be reducible to the applications of the laws of
[biology,] chemistry[,] and physics. The application of the laws of the
physical sciences can help predict the accused's physical reaction. It is
the mental component of the accused's conduct which introduces the
element of unpredictability. American criminal law operates on the
assumption that the typical person possesses cognitive and volitional
capacities. The variety of ways in which the person can exercise those
capacities makes it difficult to forecast the person's mental state at any
given time.

. .

. The risk of overestimation exists because the response

to a situation includes a variable mental component. 61

In short, there is no excuse for exempting uncharged misconduct
evidence from the character evidence prohibition merely because the
prosecution offers the evidence to show the accused's mens rea: "he
thought it once, ergo he thought it again" is just as much improper
character reasoning as "he did it once, therefore he did it again." Even
when the evidence is offered to show intent, the evidence must pass
muster under Rule 404(b). 6 2
IN THEORY, DOES THE DOCTRINE OF OBJECTIVE CHANCES
QUALIFY AS A BONA FIDE NON-CHARACTER THEORY FOR ADMITTING
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE?
III.

As Part II explains, the character evidence prohibition codified in
Rule 404(b) applies with full force when the prosecution offers
uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent.63 Hence, to justify the
admission of uncharged misconduct evidence, the prosecution must
60. See supra Part I.A.
61. Imwinkelried, supranote 59, at 584.
62. United States v. Henry, 848 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2017) (Kayatta, J., concurring) (.'He
intended to do it before, ladies and gentlemen, so he must have intended to do it again.' That is
precisely the forbidden propensity inference." (quoting United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 699
(7th Cir. 2012))); State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 26-28 (Iowa 2004).
63. See supratext accompanying note 62.
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convince the judge that the evidence is admissible on a non-character
theory of logical relevance. Does the doctrine of chances qualify as a
bona fide non-character theory?
A.

The Requirementsfor Invoking the Doctrine

The requirements for properly invoking the doctrine can be
extracted from Dean Wigmore's description.64 To begin with, the
charged and uncharged incidents must be generally similar." There is no
across-the-board requirement that to be admissible under Rule 404(b), an
uncharged incident be similar to the charged offense." The text of Rule
404(b) does not include the adjective, "similar." Under Rule 404(b), the
courts often admit "consciousness of guilt" evidence." Thus, in a
murder prosecution, Rule 404(b) would allow the prosecution to show
that the accused had attempted to bribe a prosecution witness;" murder
and bribery are dissimilar crimes, but the attempted bribery is relevant
for a non-character purpose.
However, a showing of similarity is a logical necessity under the
doctrine of chances.69 The cases recognizing that necessity are legion.70
Though, as Part I notes, the degree of similarity between the charged and
uncharged offenses need not be as high as when the uncharged
misconduct is offered to prove the accused's identity as the perpetrator
of the charged offense." When the prosecution offers the evidence for
identity, the two offenses must be so similar that there is likely only one
criminal who uses the modus operandi shared by the two offenses.72 In
64.

See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 2,

§ 302.

The doctrine of chances turns on circumstantial

reasoning. The core notion is that one may be innocently involved in suspicious circumstances.
However, if one is recurrently involved in questionable circumstances the likelihood of innocent
involvement diminishes. Depending upon the circumstances, at some point the recurrence alone
warrants an inference that at least one of the incidents is not attributable to innocent happenstance.

Imwinkelried, supra note 50, at 436-37.
65.

IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11,

§ 3:11.

66. Id. § 2:13.
67. Id. § 3:4.
68. Id.; see also People v. McLaurin, 811 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (App. Div. 2006).
69. See Eric D. Lanserk, Comment, Admission of Evidence of Other Misconduct in
Washington to Prove Intent or Absence of Mistake or Accident: The Logical Inconsistencies of

Evidence Rule 404(b), 61 WASH. L. REv. 1213, 1230 (1986).
70. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 458 F. App'x 727, 731-32 (10th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Cole, 537 F.3d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Nicely, 922 F.2d 850, 857 (D.C. Cir.
1991); People v. Thomas, 256 P.3d 603, 616 (Cal. 2011); People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 128 (Cal.
2009); People v. Yeoman, 72 P.3d 1166, 1190 (Cal. 2003); People v. Daniels, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659,
668 (Ct. App. 2009); People v. Hawkins, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 639 (Ct. App. 2002); People v.
Everett, 250 P.3d 649, 654 (Colo. App. 2010).
71. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
72.

See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11,
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contrast, when the evidence is offered to prove intent, the two crimes
need merely fall into the same general category." As Dean Wigmore
stated, the charged and uncharged offenses need be similar only "in
[their] gross features." 74 Suppose, for example, that the accused is
charged with possession of cocaine and that on both the charged and
uncharged occasions, the police found cocaine in a vehicle the accused
was driving. If the prosecution were offering the uncharged misconduct
to establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator of the charged drug
offense, the prosecution would have to show that both crimes were
committed with the same, unique modus operandi. 5 However, it is
sufficient to trigger the doctrine of chances to show intent that in both
instances, the accused was driving a vehicle in which drugs were found.
Innocent people sometimes end up driving cars containing drugs
secreted by other persons, but that is usually a "once-in-a-lifetime"
experience for innocent individuals. 76
The second requirement is that, considering both the charged and
uncharged incidents, the accused has been involved in such incidents
more frequently than the typical, innocent person. As the late Professor
David Leonard observed, the doctrine of chances rests on a sort of
"informal probability reasoning."7 The question is not the absolute
number of incidents." Rather, the question is whether the concurrence of
the charged and uncharged incidents would amount to an extraordinary
79
coincidence-exceeding the ordinary incidence of that type of event. If
an innocent person is likely to become involved in that type of event
only once in his or her lifetime, proof of a single uncharged, similar
incident suffices to trigger the doctrine.o However, if even innocent
persons can encounter such circumstances on multiple occasions, the
doctrine comes into play only if, considering the charged and uncharged
crimes, the accused has been enmeshed in similar circumstances more
frequently than would be expected." In some cases, the judge can rely
on common sense and experience to conclude that a particular type of

73. Everett, 250 P.3d at 658.
74. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 304.
75. IMWINKELRIED,supra note 11, § 3:13.
76. See I. H. DENNIS, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 596 (1999) (explaining that "it would be an odd
coincidence if the defendant were an innocent victim of drugs planted in his car while being in
possession of drugs elsewhere," or on more than one occasion).
77. Leonard, supra note 9, at 161-62.
78. Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 590.
79. See id.
80. See People v. Everett, 250 P.3d 649, 658-60 (Colo. App. 2010).
81. See id.
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event is a once-in-a-lifetime experience.8 2 In other cases, though, the
judge should demand that the prosecution produce evidence of the
baseline frequency of such events."
B.

The Status of the Doctrine as a Legitimate Non-CharacterTheory
Satisfying Rule 404(b)

Rule 404(b) forbids prosecutors from relying on the theory of
logical relevance, set out in Rule 404(b).84 Revisit Figure 1, above. As
Part II explained, this theory of logical relevance involves two
inferential steps, and each inference entails a significant probative
danger. The first is the inference from the item of evidence to the
intermediate inference of the accused's personal, subjective bad
character." This inference poses the danger that the jury will convict the
accused on an improper basis, that is, his or her criminal past. 6 The
second step is the inference from the accused's bad character to the
conclusion that at the time of the charged offense, the accused acted "in
character"-consistently with the character-and perpetrated the
charged offense (similar to the uncharged crime)." This step creates the
danger that the jury will overvalue the evidence." The bulk of the
relevant psychological research points to the conclusion that the general
construct of a person's character is a poor predictor of the person's
conduct on a specific occasion." Character is an especially poor
predictor when the inference as to the person's character is drawn from a
single other instance of the person's conduct; in the psychological
research studies attempting to draw such inferences, the accuracy rate
has been "at best .30."90

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Imwinkelried, supra note 59, at 591-92.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b); see supra Figure 1.
See supranote 50 and accompanying text.
See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
See supranote 53 and accompanying text.

88.

See IMWINKELRIED, supranote 11,

§ 2:19.

89. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
90. Imwinkelried, supra note 56, at 761 (explaining that in the studies attempting to infer
character from a single instance of conduct, the accuracy rate was "at best .30"); Taslitz, supra note
56, at 495 ("Of considerable concern is the fact that [the Rule] ignores the empirical data, which
require a wider range of behavior than a single prior incident of wrongful conduct, and a closer
match between the earlier situations and the present one, for prior acts to be predictive of current
ones."). These research findings are one of the reasons why rape sword statutes, such as Rule 413,
are so troublesome; on their face, they purport to permit a jury to infer character from a single
instance of uncharged misconduct. See FED. R. EvID. 413(a).
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Contrast the theory of logical relevance underlying the doctrine of
chances, using Figure 2, below.9
FIGURE 2
ITEM OF EVIDENCE
An uncharged event
involving the accused

INTERMEDIATE INFERENCE
Considered together with the
charged event, an objectively
p ULTIMATE INFERENCE
improbable coincidence The probability of the accused's
criminal state of mind at the
time of one or some of
the events

This theory not only differs superficially from the sort of character
reasoning forbidden by Figure 1 and Rule 404(b). More fundamentally,
it also differs from such reasoning with respect to both of the probative
dangers inspiring the character evidence prohibition. This theory does
not require the jurors to consciously advert to the question of the
accused's personal, subjective character. Rather, they are asked to assess
the objective improbability of so many accidents or inadvertent acts. Of
course, on their own the jurors might consider the accused's personal,
subjective character, since the testimony about the uncharged act has
dual relevance.92 However, that risk is much smaller than when the judge
expressly directs the jurors to ask themselves what type of person is the
accused. Moreover, the second step does not require the jurors to use
character as a predictor of conduct. Rather, the second step necessitates
that the jurors do what the judge will tell them to do in another part of
the jury charge, namely, draw on their common sense and knowledge
to assess the relative plausibility of the parties' competing versions of
the events. 93
1. Judicial Acceptance of the Doctrine of Chances
In light of the evident differences between character reasoning and
the doctrine of chances, the courts have endorsed the doctrine as a
legitimate non-character theory. 94 The courts have permitted prosecutors
91. Comparesupra Figure 1, with infra Figure 2.
92. See supra text accompanying note 28.
93. See United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Hamie, 165 F.3d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Gainey, 111 F.3d 834, 836 (11th Cir.
1997); United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 775 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Flores-Chapa,
48 F.3d 156, 161 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Donovan, 24 F.3d 908, 913 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1993); Zada v. Scully, 847 F. Supp. 325, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
94. See United States v. Young, 65 F. Supp. 2d 370, 372-75 (E.D. Va. 1999) (collecting cases
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to use the doctrine for several purposes. One of the leading American
cases is United States v. Woods." In that case, the accused was charged
with infanticide. 6 The victim had died of cyanosis.97 The accused
claimed that the child's suffocation was accidental." To rebut the
accused's claim, the prosecution offered evidence that, over an
approximately twenty-five-year period, children in her custody had
experienced twenty cyanotic episodes.99 The trial judge admitted the
testimony, and the appellate court upheld the ruling.o The court
reasoned that the testimony established an extraordinary coincidence
of cyanotic episodes among children in the accused's custody and that,
in turn, that incidence was circumstantial evidence that one or some
of the episodes were not accidental but rather the product of an
actus reus.'0 o Although the court ruled the evidence admissible on a
doctrine of chances theory, the court stressed that the record of trial
included testimony by a distinguished forensic pathologist, Dr. Vincent
Di Maio, that there was a seventy-five percent chance that the charged
incident was a homicide.102 While the uncharged misconduct evidence
can be admissible under the doctrine of chances, there is nothing
inherent in the doctrine's logic that singles out the charged incident as a
crime. The logic only supplies circumstantial evidence that one or some
of the incidents were not accidents. In Woods, standing alone, the
uncharged misconduct evidence might not have been legally sufficient to
sustain a conviction; but coupled with the evidence, Dr. Di Maio's
testimony satisfied the prosecution's burden of production on the actus
reus issue.io0
Of greater interest for our present purpose, the courts accepting the
doctrine also allow prosecutors to employ the doctrine to establish mens
rea. 104 Sometimes, criminals plant drugs on an innocent person or in an
applying the doctrine of chances); Wynn v. State, 718 A.2d 588, 607 (Md. 1998) (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (listing cases in which appellate courts have utilized the doctrine); see also People v.
Spector, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 65 (Ct. App. 2011).
95. 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973); see also Recent Case, Evidence-Proofof Particular
Facts-Evidence That Defendant May Have Committed Similar Crimes Is Admissable to Prove

Corpus Delicti of Murder-UnitedStates v. Woods 484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973), 87 HARV. L. REV.
1074, 1074-75 (1974).
96. Woods, 484 F.2d at 128-30.
97. Id. at 129.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 130-32.
100. Id. at 129-34.
101. Id. at 133-35.
102. Id. at 130.
103. See id. at 135.
104. See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708, 745 (Cal. 1997), abrogatedon other grounds
by People v. Diaz, 345 P.3d 62 (Cal. 2015).
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innocent person's car in order to implicate them. But again, that seems
like a once-in-a-life experience. If an accused charged with drug
possession claims that the drugs must have been planted in his or her car
but the prosecution has evidence that on another occasion the police also
found the accused driving a car containing illegal drugs, cumulatively,
the two incidents show a very "odd coincidence.""os Just as the doctrine
permitted the Woods prosecution to use the uncharged misconduct as
evidence of actus reus, in this case the prosecution may introduce the
evidence as proof of mens rea.
2. Scholarly Challenges to the Doctrine's Status as a
Non-Character Theory
While there is now extensive judicial support for the doctrine of
chances, some commentators have contended that the doctrine is nothing
more than a smokescreen for bad-character reasoning.106 These critics
begin their line of argument by noting that the doctrine of chances rests
on a species of statistical reasoning.' 07 Indeed, when civil rights
plaintiffs invoke the doctrine in discrimination suits, they often offer
formal statistical testimony to prove the defendant's intent to
discriminate."0 s The null hypothesis is that there has been no
discrimination. The statistician then estimates what the expected value
would be-for example, the number of African Americans or women
hired-if the null hypothesis were true. The statistician next determines
the observed value, the number actually hired. If the disparity between
the expected and observed values is too great to be attributable to
random chance, the null hypothesis is rejected; and, its rejection
furnishes some evidence of the truth of the alternative hypothesis that
there has been discrimination.109 The critics of the doctrine of chances
contend that the probability reasoning underlying the doctrine is
propensity-based.11 0 In essence, the contention is that once random,
innocent chance is eliminated, the only remaining logical route to the
ultimate inference is an intermediate inference assuming the accused's
105.
106.

DENNIS, supra note 76, at 596.
See Andrew J. Morris, FederalRule ofEvidence 404(b): The FictitiousBan on Character

Reasoning from Other Crime Evidence, 17 REV. LITIG. 181, 199-201 (1998); Paul F. Rothstein,
Intellectual Coherence in an Evidence Code, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1259, 1262-64 (1995); see also
Lisa Marshall, Note, The Characterof Discrimination Law: The Incompatibility of Rule 404 and

Employment DiscriminationSuits, 114 YALE L.J. 1063, 1085-86 (2005).
107. Morris, supra note 106, at 192-94.
108. Marshall, supranote 106, at 1080-81.
109.

See DAVID W. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS

OF QUANTITATIVE

EVIDENCE 91-92 (1983); see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 & n.13 (1977).
110. See, e.g., Marshall, supranote 106, at 1080-82.
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bad character."' The critics assert that without positing the accused has
a character that is "continuing, "112 "constant,"ll 3 and "unchanging"1 1 4
"across time,"' 15 there is no logical nexus between the accused's
uncharged act and the charged offense. 116
However, these criticisms are flawed. First, in Figure 2, work
forward from left to right toward the final conclusion."' The critics'
implicit assumption is that once random, innocent chance is eliminated,
the only way to reason toward the final conclusion is to posit an
intermediate inference of the accused's constant, unchanged bad
character. That assumption is plainly false. The assumption rests on a
simplistic, determinist view of human behavior. Consistent with Western
philosophic tradition, for the most part, American law assumes that
persons are autonomous" human beings with volitional capacity. 19
Simply stated, they possess free will.1 20 In Figure 2, it is possible to
reason to the ultimate inference without assuming the accused's constant
bad character:
A person may have characteristics predisposing him or her to act in a
certain way, but situationally the person can make a choice contrary to
the character trait. For example, even if a person has a propensity
toward criminal conduct, in a given case the deterrent effect of the
criminal law might be so strong that she makes an ad hoc choice to
refrain from committing a crime. Conversely, even if a person has a
propensity toward lawful conduct, in a given case she might encounter
a tremendous temptation and make a situational choice to perpetrate
a crime. 12 1

Now, in Figure 2, work from right to left-that is, backward from
the ultimate inference. 12 2 The critics misconceive the doctrine of
chances. If it' were true that the accused had a continuing, constant,

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
at 451.
120.
121.

§

Id. at 1071-72, 1081.
Morris, supranote 106, at 195, 201.
Id. at 194, 201.
Id at 201.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 191-201.
See supra Figure 2.
See generally GERALD DwORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONoMY (1988).
MORTIMER J. ADLER, Six GREAT IDEAS 141-42, 164 (1981); Imwinkelried, supranote 50,

ADLER, supra note 119; Imwinkelried, supra note 50, at 451.
Imwinkelried, supra note 50, at 451; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW

1.5(a)(2)-(4) (5th ed. 2010).
122. See supra Figure 2.
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unchanging character, the ultimate inference would be that "all" 1 2 3 the
outcomes were the same. "[E]very" act would be either innocent or
criminal.1 24 However, the proponents of the doctrine such as Wigmore
make a much more limited claim. Their only claim is that when the
doctrine applies, one or some of the outcomes are attributable to fault. 125
That is why in the leading Woods decision, the court placed such heavy
stress on the fact that the lower court record contained both the
uncharged misconduct evidence and Dr. Di Maio's findings as to the
homicidal character of the death charged in that case. 126 The doctrine of
chances yields only a limited ultimate inference. As a matter of simple
logic, the doctrine does not entail the intermediate inference of constant,
unchanging bad character that the doctrine's critics claim. The upshot is
that not only do the courts accept the doctrine of chances, but they also,
in principle, may do so without violating Rule 404(b)."'
IV. IN PRACTICE, ARE THE COURTS APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF
OBJECTIVE CHANCES IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES JURORS WILL USE
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE ADMITTED UNDER THE
DOCTRINE ONLY FOR A NON-CHARACTER PURPOSE?

Part III demonstrates that the courts are justified in treating the
doctrine of chances as a legitimate non-character theory for introducing
uncharged misconduct evidence. Today, the critical question is not
whether it is warranted to recognize the existence of the doctrine.
Rather, the key question is the manner in which the courts are applying
the doctrine. Are they applying it in a scrupulous manner that upholds
the character evidence prohibition, or are they applying it in a loose
manner that threatens to undermine the prohibition? An examination of
the cases invoking the doctrine to permit proof of mens rea reveals that
in many cases, the latter is true.

123. Morris, supra note 106, at 203.
124. Id. at 201.
125. Imwinkelried, supranote 50, at 456-57.
126. Id. at 456, 461.
127. United States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796, 798-99 (1st Cir. 1995) ("The
justification ... is that no inference as to the defendant's character is required."); United States v.
York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1350 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that under the doctrine of chances, the
"inference is purely objective, and has nothing to do with a subjective assessment of [the
defendant's] character"); People v. VanderVliet, 508 N.W.2d 114, 125, 128-29, 128 n.35 (Mich.
1993).
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The Deficiencies in the CurrentJudicialAdministration of the
Doctrine of Objective Chances

1. The Dangerously Conclusory Nature of Many of the Opinions
Relying on the Doctrine of Objective Chances to Justify the
Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence to Prove Intent
The doctrine of chances is not the only theory of logical relevance
that can justify the admission of uncharged misconduct evidence to
prove intent. By way of example, suppose that the police stopped a car
the accused was driving and found drugs in the trunk. The accused
denies both knowing that the truck contained drugs and having any
intention to possess the drugs. However, before trial, the accused
threatened and attempted to bribe one of the prosecution witnesses. At
trial, the prosecution attempts to introduce testimony about the threat
and attempted bribe, but the defense objects that the testimony would
violate the character evidence prohibition. In all likelihood, the trial
judge would both characterize the testimony as evidence of the
accused's "consciousness of guilt"l 28 and admit it under Rule 404(b) as
some evidence that the accused possessed a criminal intent.12 9
However, if the prosecution wants to introduce uncharged
misconduct evidence to prove intent and no other non-character theory
applies, by process of elimination the prosecution often falls back on the
doctrine of chances as a last resort. Even when careful scrutiny of the
fact pattern indicates that the prosecution's only tenable non-character
theory is the doctrine, the courts frequently do not explicitly invoke the
doctrine.13 0 United States v. Evans, a prosecution for knowing receipt of
stolen goods, is a case in point.13 1 The court sustained the admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence of the accused's receipt of other stolen
goods, 13 2 and, on the facts, the doctrine of chances appears to be the
only conceivably applicable non-character theory. Yet the court never
mentioned the theory. The court implicitly relied on the doctrine without
using the label, "the doctrine of objective chances."' 3 3 United States v.
Campbell, a 2015 prosecution for the knowing preparation of false tax
returns, fits the same mold.' 34

128.

IMWINKELRIED, supranote 11,

§ 3:4.

129. Id. § 5:15.
130. Leonard, supranote 9, at 164.
131. 27 F.3d 1219, 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Leonard, supra note 9, at 164
(discussing Evans as a case employing the doctrine of chances without labeling it as such).
132. Evans, 27 F.3d at 1232.
133. Leonard, supra note 9, at 164.
134. 142 F. Supp. 3d 298, 299, 300-01 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
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Moreover, even when the courts purport to apply the doctrine in so
many words, in many instances their analysis is shallow.135 These courts
do not pause to inquire whether the prosecution has satisfied the
foundational requirements for the doctrine. In particular, they rarely
demand that the prosecution demonstrate a baseline frequency or
incidence for the type of event involved in the instant case to support the
inference that cumulatively, the charged and uncharged incidents
establish an extraordinary coincidence.
Many cases involving drug prosecutions fall into this pattern. It is a
commonplace observation that the courts have been very liberal in
admitting uncharged misconduct evidence of other drug transactions to
prove intent in drug prosecutions.13 6 Especially when the accused is
charged with a possessory offense with intent to distribute, the courts
routinely admit evidence of the accused's other drug offenses.137
Although the accused is charged with intent to traffic and distribute, a
large number of courts admit uncharged misconduct evidence that the
accused possessed mere user quantities. 138 The opinions are replete with
sweeping assertions that "virtually any prior drug offense" is admissible
to prove intent in a drug prosecution.' 39
However, in any case in which the prosecution is relying on the
doctrine of chances, such sweeping generalizations are indefensible.
These opinions give the impression that the admissibility of the evidence
in these cases turns on a question of precedent, namely, whether
uncharged drug offenses are admissible to prove intent in drug
prosecutions. However, that generalization is overbroad. The decisive
question is fact- and case-specific: whether the prosecution has laid
a foundation satisfying both requirements for triggering the doctrine
of chances.
There are certainly intent to distribute cases in which it is warranted
to apply the doctrine. Suppose that, on multiple occasions, the accused
was found in possession of huge quantities of a drug-quantities that
135. See Leonard, supra note 9, at 148, 152, 159 (discussing the "weak judicial analysis" of
the admissibility of uncharged misconduct, asserting that courts often affirm the admission of
uncharged misconduct evidence with "little or no analysis," and discussing that trial courts do not
scrutinize the facts carefully to make certain that the evidence possesses genuine non-character
relevance under the doctrine of chances).
136. Id. at 148 ("The courts have liberally admitted evidence of the defendant's other drug
activities.. . ."); see Michael H. Graham, Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Culpable Acts Evidence: The
Waning Penchant Toward Admissibility as the Wars Against Crime Stagger on; PartI The War on
Drugs-The Seventh Circuit Crosses Over to the Dark Side, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 875, 879-81 (2013).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson, 725 F.3d 829, 836 (8th Cir. 2013).
138. Id.
139. United States v. Sanders, 668 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Matthews, 431 F.3d 1296, 1311 (llth Cir. 2005)).
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could exceed a lifetime supply for a casual drug user. Even if the
accused were a neophyte drug-user who could not accurately predict
their personal needs, they would quickly discover that they had acquired
a quantity far exceeding their personal needs. It is objectively unlikely
that a person could acquire such a quantity on several occasions without
at least once entertaining the intent to distribute. That would be a
sensible application of the doctrine. However, the generalization that any
drug offense is admissible to prove intent to distribute goes well beyond
the limits of the doctrine. When the issue is intent to distribute and
engage in commercial trafficking, the possession of a minuscule drug
quantity, barely useful for personal use, is hardly similar to the
possession of a warehouse full of the drug. For that matter, even a prior
conviction for conspiracy to traffic in drugs may not pass muster under
the doctrine of chances. The court must examine the facts underlying the
conspiracy conviction. An accused may have been convicted of such a
conspiracy because he or she was the accountant for the conspiracy and
never saw, much less possessed, any quantity of the drug.' 40 Similarly,
the broad net of conspiracy could extend to an accused who purchased
the instrumentation for processing the drug but never held a gram of the
drug in his or her hand. Indeed, the accused could have suffered the
conspiracy conviction even though he or she had never possessed drugs
in his or her entire life. In short, when a court is content with conclusory
analysis in a doctrine of chances case, there is a grave risk that the end
result will be the introduction of inadmissible bad character evidence.
2. The Inadequacy of the Limiting Instructions Typically
Administered in Doctrine of Objective Chances Cases
As previously stated, uncharged misconduct testimony often has
dual relevance.14 1 When a single item of evidence is relevant for
two purposes, one permissible and the other impermissible, the judge
ordinarily 4 2 admits the evidence but gives the jury a limiting instruction.
140. See Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 717-18 (2013); Salinas v. United States, 522
U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997); Stewart v. Texas, 474 U.S. 866, 869 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 13.3 (2d ed. 2003).
141. See Leonard, supranote 9, at 165.
142. As the text indicates, in these situations, the judge typically admits the item of evidence
but gives the jury a limiting instruction, which (1) identifies the permissible use of the evidence but
(2) forbids the jury from using the evidence for the impermissible purpose. The courts usually
assume that lay jurors are both willing and able to follow limiting instructions. Cf David Alan
Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN. L. REV. 407, 414-19, 424-30,
451 (2013).
However, in extreme cases, the judge may conclude that it is fanciful to think that the jury
will be willing and able to comply with the limiting instruction. RONALD L. CARLSON & EDWARD J.
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Rule 105 governs limiting instructions: "If the court admits evidence that
is admissible . .. for a purpose-but not . .. for another purpose-the

court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope
and instruct the jury accordingly."1 4 3 A complete, properly worded
limiting instruction has two prongs. 14 4 The negative prong forbids the
jury from using the evidence for the verboten purpose. In contrast, the
affirmative prong explains how the jury is permitted to reason about
the evidence.
How should the trial judge word the instruction in an uncharged
misconduct evidence case? In the past, in many jurisdictions, after
instructing the jury not to use the testimony as proof of the accused's
bad character, the judge listed a litany of permissible purposes. For
example, in the affirmative prong of the instruction, the judge might tell
the jury that they could use the evidence as proof of "motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident"-perhaps the entire list of purposes set out in Rule
404(b) or the equivalent state statute. 145 At the very least, a "shotgun"
instruction can confuse the jury; on the facts, the uncharged misconduct
evidence may not be at all relevant to one or more of the listed purposes.
Worse still, the instruction can prompt the jury to engage in improper
character reasoning; the evidence may be relevant to one of the listed
purposes but only if the jury posits an intermediate inference of the
accused's subjective, personal bad character.
Fortunately, a growing number of jurisdictions now forbid trial
judges from giving "shotgun" instructions. 146 If the uncharged
misconduct is relevant on only one non-character theory, to a degree, the
instruction must identify and specify that purpose. 147 However, like
many judicial opinions applying the doctrine of chances, even modernly,
most pattern instructions on uncharged misconduct evidence are
conclusory. After stating the negative prong of the instruction, in the

IMWINKELRIED, DYNAMICS OF TRIAL PRACTICE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS § 15.3(A) (5th ed.
2017). On rare occasions, the Supreme Court itself has held that it is unrealistic to believe that a jury
can carry out a particular type of judicial instruction. Id. at 439-41 (citing Bruton v. United States,

391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96
(1933)). The fact pattern may create a "perfect storm" rendering the instruction ineffective: the
evidence is directly relevant to a critical issue in the case, the source of the evidence presumably has

personal knowledge of the facts, and the source is either the opposing litigant himself, herself, or
someone with a close relationship to the litigant. Id. at 441.
143. FED. R. EvID. 105.
144.

IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11,

§§

9:73-:74.

145. Id. § 9:74.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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affirmative prong the judge may give the jury only the guidance that
they may use the evidence for the purpose of proving "intent."'4 8
Although that wording is preferable to a "shotgun" jury charge,
even this instruction is inadequate. Again, uncharged misconduct
evidence ordinarily has dual relevance. If the facts satisfy the
requirements for invoking the doctrine of chances, the jury can draw the
ultimate inference of intent without positing an intermediate assumption
that the accused has a disposition or propensity for criminal or immoral
conduct. The rub is that the jury can also reason to the same ultimate
inference through improper character reasoning. The juror might think,
"He had the intent once, therefore he had it again." In a 1991 decision,
Estelle v. McGuire, the Supreme Court dealt with the instructions in a
child abuse case implicating the doctrine of chances.14 9 In their
concurring and dissenting opinion in that case, Justices O'Connor and
Stevens expressed their view that there was a due process violation,
warranting federal habeas corpus relief, because the state judge's
instruction blurred the line between character reasoning and the doctrine
of chances.' In this context, blurring the line is an acute danger; given a
choice between "intuitive"'"' character reasoning and more
"attenuated"' 52 reasoning under the doctrine, the jury may find the
character theory simpler and more attractive.
Research reveals no appellate opinion mandating that trial judges
give a special limiting instruction in doctrine of chances cases. Similarly,
no jurisdiction seems to have adopted a special pattern instruction for
doctrine of chances cases.' 53
148. See id.
149. 502 U.S. 62, 64-65, 67-68, 70-75 (1991).
150. Id. at 64, 75-80 (O'Connor, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). In this case, the state trial judge's instruction included a negative as well as an affirmative
prong. Id. at 67 n. 1. The negative prong informed the jury that the uncharged misconduct testimony
"may not be considered by you to prove that [the defendant] is a person of bad character or that he
has a disposition to commit crimes." Id. However, the affirmative prong was very vaguely worded.
The affirmative prong told the jury that they could consider the evidence:
[O]nly for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show ... a clear connection
between the other two [uncharged] offense[s] and the one of which the Defendant is
accused, so that it may be logically concluded that if the Defendant committed the other
offenses, he also committed the crime charged in this case.
Id. The instruction did not define the necessary "clear connection" or direct the jury to consider the
objective probability of the defendant's involvement in so many accidents. Id.; see supra text
accompanying notes 26-27. Given the jurors' lack of legal training, it is perfectly plausible that after
hearing this instruction, the jurors voted to convict on the basis of improper character reasoning.
151. Leonard, supra note 9, at 139, 144.
152. Id. at 139.
153. There are pattern instructions on uncharged misconduct evidence in many jurisdictions.
See, e.g., ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES)

(2016), http://www.cal l.uscourts.gov/pattem-jury-instructions;

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol45/iss3/6
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1.1-2, 4.1-.2
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The Remedies for the Deficiencies

Once the deficiencies in the current judicial administration in the
doctrine of chances are identified, it is relatively clear what corrective
action ought to be taken. As Subpart A demonstrates, the first major
deficiency is the conclusory nature of many courts' analysis of the
application of the doctrine. 15 4 To remedy that problem, appellate courts

THE THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY TABLE OF CONTENTS AND INSTRUCTIONS

4.29

(2016),

§§

2.23,

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/model-criminal-jury-table-contents-and-instructions;

SIXTH CIRCUIT COMM. ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PATrERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 7.13 (2016), http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/patternjury/
pdf/13 Chapter_7_0.pdf; U.S. COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH CIRCUIT, EIGHTH CIRCUIT MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS §§ 2.08-08A (2014), http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/Manual of

Model Criminal JuryInstructionsNew and-Revised%208_5_2014.pdf; U.S. DIST. COURT DIST.
OF ME., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST
2

CIRCUIT § 2.06 (2015), http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/sites/cal/files/citations/ 015%20Revisions%
20
0f
20to%2oPattem%2oCriminal%2Jury%20Instructions%20for/o2othe%2ODistrict%2oCourts%
%20the%20First%20Circuit.pdf;

(CRIMINAL)

§ 26A

STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS

(4th ed. 2016), http://www.azbar.org/media/1 179884/rajicriminal-4thed2016-

final.pdf; JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 375 (2016), http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/
calcrim_2016 edition.pdf; PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE § 4.4 (2016), http://courts.delaware.gov/superior/pattem/pdfs/
pattern ciminaljury_rev4_2016.pdf; GEORGIA STATE BAR JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL
§ 1.34.10 (2016); HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, HAWAI'I CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.03 (2005),
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/docs4/crimjuryinstruct.pdf; STATE OF IDAHO JUDICIAL BRANCH
SUPREME COURT, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 303 (2010), https://isc.idaho.gov/main/criminaljury-instructions; MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL § 6-15 (2016); MARYLAND CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND COMMENTARY § 2.29(A) (3d ed. 2016); MASS. DIST. COURT, CRIMINAL
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.800 (2016), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/courts-and-judges/
OHIO JURY
courts/district-court/jury-instructions-criminal/criminal-model-jury-instructions.pdf;
INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL § 401.25 (2016); OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

CRIMINAL

§ 9-9

(2d ed. 2017), http://www.okcca.net/online/oujis/oujisrvr.jsp?oc=OUJI-CR%209-9;

PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.08 (2016); SOUTH CAROLINA
REQUESTS TO CHARGE - CRIMINAL §§ 1-16, -17 (2007); TExAS CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY
CHARGES §§ 3.1, A3.1 (2016) INSTRUCTIONS FOR VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA § 24-250 (2016);
see also PROPOSED MISSISSIPPI PLAIN LANGUAGE MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CRIMINAL

§ 205 (2012), https://courts.ms.gov/mmji/Proposed%20Plain%2Language%2Model% 2 0Jury%
20Instructions%20-%20Criminal.pdf.
The instructions fall into three general categories. Some are "shotgun" instructions, which
merely list a number of permissible non-character uses for uncharged misconduct evidence. See,
e.g., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE, supra. Others contain such a list but add a paragraph or short paragraph going into
more detail about particular uses. See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT,

supra. Still others employ brackets to signal the trial judge that he or she should specify the noncharacter purpose or purposes that the judge is relying on as the justification for admitting the
evidence. See, e.g., MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL, supra. However, there do not appear to be

any instructions that contain an amplification for situations in which the prosecution is relying on
the doctrine of chances to prove intent.

154.

See supraPart IV.A..
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should direct that trial judges do the following. First, if the judge
believes that the prosecution's uncharged misconduct evidence is
admissible under the doctrine of chances, the judge should reflect on the
record that the judge is relying on the doctrine as the non-character
theory satisfying Rule 404(b). Next, in these cases, the judge ought to
make explicit findings as to whether the prosecution has satisfied the
substantive requirements for triggering the doctrine. Why did the judge
conclude that all the underlying events are sufficiently similar? In
addition, what is the judge's assumption about the baseless frequency or
incidence for such events-has there been an adequate showing of an
extraordinary coincidence? If the lower court record is fleshed out in this
fashion, the appellate courts can engage in much more meaningful
review of the propriety of the judge's decision to admit the evidence
under the doctrine. Absent such findings by the trial judge on the record,
it is difficult-if not impossible-for the appellate court to intelligently
second-guess the judge's application of the doctrine.
The second major deficiency is the inadequacy of the limiting
instructions given in most jurisdictions. A "shotgun" instruction is
certainly insufficient, and even more specific instructions singling out
proof of "intent" as a permissible use of the uncharged misconduct can
lead the jury into improper character reasoning."' In cases involving
similar uncharged and charged misconduct, there is such a fine line
between character reasoning and reasoning under the doctrine that
jurisdictions should develop special instructions on the doctrine. The
following illustrative language could serve as a starting point for drafting
such an instruction:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as you know, the defendant is
charged with the crime of possession of cocaine in January 2016.
The prosecution testimony indicates that when a police officer
stopped the defendant's car in January 2016, the officer found
cocaine in the trunk of the car. The defendant denies that he intended
to possess that cocaine; he denies even knowing that there was
cocaine in the trunk.

155. It might be argued that the latter type of instruction is adequate because during closing
argument the attorneys can explain the instruction to the jurors. However, that argument is
unpersuasive. To begin with, the jurors pay more attention to what the judge tells them. Mark A.
Dombroff, Jury Instructions Can Be Crucial in Trial Process, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 1985, at 26,
26. The jurors realize that the attorneys are partisans and tend to discount the attorneys' statements.
Moreover, the judge's explanation is more likely to be accurate, at least in the sense that it is more
balanced and neutral than either attorney's explanation.
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(Initially, the judge must instruct the jury on the standardfor
deciding whether the accused committed the uncharged act. If the
prosecution testimony does not satisfy the governing standard, the
jury may not consider the testimony about the uncharged act for
any purpose.)15 6 To prove the defendant's criminal intent, the
prosecution has introduced testimony indicating that on another
occasion in April 2015, while the defendant was driving a different
car, he was stopped and cocaine was found in the trunk of that car.
Although the prosecution has introduced that testimony, the
defendant took the stand and denied that the alleged April 2015
incident ever occurred. I instruct you that the prosecution has the
burden of convincing you by a preponderance of the evidence that
the other incident occurred, namely, that in April 2015 the defendant
was driving another car containing cocaine in the trunk. If you do
not believe that the prosecution has met that burden, you must
completely disregard the testimony about the alleged April 2015
incident. If you reach that conclusion, you cannot consider the
testimony for any purpose during your deliberations on the
defendant's guilt or innocence of the January 2016 charge.
(At this point, the judge administers the limiting instruction about
the use of the uncharged misconduct evidence. The judge can begin
the instruction by stating the negative prong.) Even if you decide
that the prosecution has met that burden, there are limitations on the
way in which you can use the testimony about the April 2015
incident. The defendant is on trial only for the alleged January 2016
incident. You may convict the defendant only if you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed that crime. Even if you
believe the testimony about the 2015 incident, you may not convict
him because he intentionally possessed cocaine in 2015. You may
not reason: He intended to possess cocaine once before, that shows
156. In Huddleston v. United States, the Supreme Court announced that Rule 104(b) governs
the determination of whether the accused committed an uncharged act. 485 U.S. 681, 689-92
(1988). Under Rule 104(b), the judge makes a limited, screening decision whether the prosecution's
foundational testimony is sufficient to support a rational, permissive jury finding that the accused
committed the act. Id. at 690. If the foundational testimony suffices, the judge admits the testimony.
In the final jury charge, the judge instructs the jury that they are to determine whether the
prosecution has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused perpetrated the act.
See id. The judge further directs the jury to completely disregard the testimony about the uncharged
act if they decide that the prosecution has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that
the accused committed that act. Id. Not all states follow Huddleston. Some require that, before
admitting the evidence, the judge must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the accused
committed the uncharged act. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 11, § 2:9. Other jurisdictions demand
clear and convincing evidence. Id
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that he is a bad man, and that therefore he had that intent again in the
January 2016 incident.
(Now the judge states the affirmative prong of the limiting
instruction.) However, in deciding this case, you may rely on your
knowledge of the way things happen in the real world. You may ask
yourself: How likely is it that an innocent person would twice be
found driving a car containing cocaine in the trunk? Innocent people
sometimes find themselves in suspicious circumstances. However,
use your common sense and decide whether it is likely that that
would happen to an innocent person twice. If you find that that is at
odds with everyday experience, you may conclude that on one or
both of those occasions the defendant had the intent to possess
the cocaine.
If the judge decides to admit uncharged misconduct testimony, the
judge's limiting instruction may be the accused's final and most
important safeguard against the danger that the jury will misuse the
testimony as evidence of the accused's bad character.157 Since the
testimony has dual relevance, there is an unavoidable possibility that on
its own motion, the jury will treat the testimony as bad character
evidence. However, the judge can minimize that risk by giving the jury a
clear, forceful limiting instruction; and defense counsel can further
reduce the risk by underscoring the negative prong of the instruction
during closing argument. In everyday life, laypersons do not force
themselves to identify every intermediate inference between a fact they
are presented with and their ultimate conclusion. If the jury is exposed to
uncharged misconduct evidence and the judge gives the jury little
guidance as to the proper use of the evidence, the jurors may be inclined
to intuitively use the simplistic reasoning that "he had the criminal intent
before, therefore he had it again.""' That sort of reasoning comes
naturally and easily to laypersons. If we want to honor the character
evidence prohibition and encourage lay jurors to reason differently about
the evidence, the trial judge must give the jurors a more elaborate
limiting instruction. Neither a "shotgun" instruction nor even an
instruction singling out "intent" as a permissible use of the evidence is
sufficiently respectful of Rule 404(b).

157. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Limiting Instructions on UnchargedMisconduct Evidence: The
Last Line ofDefense Against Jury Misuse of the Evidence, TRIAL DIPL. J., Fall 1985, at 23, 24.
158. See Leonard, supranote 9, at 144.
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CONCLUSION

It is difficult to overstate the philosophic and practical importance
of this issue. Although many nations in the common law world still
recognize some version of the character evidence prohibition, only the
United States has a full-fledged constitutional ban on the punishment of
status offenses.15 9 The numbers tell the story about the practical
significance of the issue. As previously stated, in criminal cases, Rule
404(b) produces more published opinions than any other provision of the
Rules, 16 0 and prosecutors offer Rule 404(b) evidence to prove intent
more often than for any other purpose.16 1 If the judicial application of
Rule 404(b) is to be more than an intellectually dishonest "exercise in
evasion," 162 we must reform the lax attitude that many courts have taken
in determining whether uncharged misconduct evidence offered to prove
intent possesses genuine non-character relevance and how lay jurors are
instructed about the permissible use of such evidence.
The root problem is that the distinction between character reasoning
and reasoning under the doctrine of objective chances is so thin. 163 In lay
jurors' minds, "the events are so similar that it is improbable that there
were so many inadvertent acts" can easily elide into "the events are so
similar that the accused has a propensity for this criminal intent." To
prevent that improper conversion, the courts must do more than most
courts presently do. To begin with, the appellate courts have to pressure
trial judges to develop records of trial that permit meaningful review of
the application of the doctrine in the lower court. It should be
insufficient for trial judges to recite on the record the generalization that
uncharged misconduct evidence is admissible to prove intent. If the
judge intends to rely on the doctrine of chances, he or she should do so
explicitly. Furthermore, the appellate court should demand that the judge
make findings as to whether the charged and uncharged acts are
sufficiently similar and whether, considered together, the concurrence
of the charged and uncharged acts establishes an extraordinary
coincidence exceeding the baseline frequency for inadvertent events of
the same character.
Moreover, it is not enough that the trial judge convince the
appellate court that it was proper to invoke the doctrine on the facts in
the lower court. Even more importantly, the judge must clearly convey
159. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
160. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
162. Blinka, supra note 33, at 110.
163. See United States v. Derington, 229 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2000); State v. Brown, 900
A.2d 1155, 1160 (R.I. 2006).
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the doctrine of chances theory to the lay jurors in a limiting instruction.
The decisive question is whether the jury engaged in improper character
reasoning during their deliberations. The line between character
reasoning and reasoning under the doctrine of chances is so fine that
neither a "shotgun" instruction nor even an instruction mentioning only
proof of "intent" as an allowable use of the evidence should be deemed
adequate. Both a character rationale and reasoning according to the
doctrine can lead to the same result, namely the jury's conclusion that
the uncharged misconduct evidence is some proof of intent. The issue is
the logical route or path that the jury takes to reach that result. If that
path proceeds through the inference, "the events are so similar that the
accused has a propensity for this criminal intent," the accused's
conviction may violate the Eighth Amendment.164 In the large number of
cases in which the prosecution must rely on a doctrine of chances theory
to justify introducing uncharged misconduct to prove intent, the trial and
appellate courts should do more to secure the accused's Eighth
Amendment rights. In our system of criminal justice, the well-settled
tradition is that a citizen may be convicted only for what he or she has
done-their mental and physical conduct at a specific place and timeand not for the type of person they are.165 The current lax administration
of the doctrine of objective chances seriously imperils that tradition.

164. Imwinkelried, supranote 59, at 581.
165. See People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 504 (Mich. 1988) ("[I]n our system of
jurisprudence, we try cases, rather than persons . . . ."). In Romer v. Evans, the so-called "Colorado
Gay Rights Case," the Court used language to the effect that it is improper to penalize a person for
his or her status. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
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RobertA. Leonard*
Juliane E. R. Ford**
Tanya Karoli Christensen***

I.

INTRODUCTION

The well-established science of linguistics analyzes all aspects of
human language. Linguistics has many subfields, including the study of
language structure, sound patterns, the dynamics of language in
interpersonal and intergroup communication, and the interplay of
meaning, grammar, and context.' In academic departments it is often
paired with other neighboring disciplines such as cognitive science.2
The branch of linguistics known as "forensic linguistics"
applies the science of linguistic investigation to issues of the law.'
Forensic linguistics augments legal analysis by applying rigorous,
scientifically accepted principles of language analysis to legal evidence
such as e-mails, text messages, contracts, letters, confessions, and
recorded speech.4

* Professor of Linguistics, Hofstra University; Director of Institute for Forensic Linguistics,
Threat Assessment and Strategic Analysis, Forensic Linguistics Capital Case Innocence Project, and
the Graduate Program in Linguistics: Forensic Linguistics; Robert Leonard Associates; Ph.D. 1982,
M.A. & M.Phil. 1973, Columbia University.
** Ph.D. Candidate 2021, Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom; M.A. 2016,
Hofstra University.
*** Associate Professor, Department of Nordic Studies and Linguistics, University of
Copenhagen, Denmark; Ph.D. 2007, M.A. 2002, Roskilde University.
1.

See What Is Linguistics?, LINGUISTIC

SOC'Y AM., http://www.linguisticsociety.org/

resource/what-linguistics (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
2.

The Science of Linguistics, LINGUISTIC SOC'Y AM., http://www.linguisticsociety.org/
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Linguists seek, as do other scientists, to explain the non-random
distribution of data. Bullets do not randomly discharge from firearms,
chemical concentrations do not randomly spread throughout a human
body, and words are not randomly found to issue from the keyboards and
mouths of speakers of English or any other language.6 Words adhere to
patterns, and linguists are trained to identify, analyze, and explain these
patterns.' In common with all other sciences, linguists solve problems by
constructing competing hypotheses and then testing which hypothesis
best explains patterns found in the data.'
In legal systems, language is key.' Through language we
promulgate laws, issue subpoenas and warrants, question suspects,
provide testimony, write contracts, and confess to crimes.o All of these
acts have significant consequences, and understanding the characteristics
of the language used to perform them can often provide important
insights." As biology and physics play crucial roles in the interpretation
of medical and ballistic data, forensic linguistics offers comparable
insights into the understanding of legally significant language data.12
The scientific analysis in which forensic linguists engage has been
increasingly utilized:
Now linguists are applying their field's knowledge to such areas as
statutory law and interpretation, voice and authorship identification,
jury instructions, the asymmetry of power in courtroom exchanges,
lawyer-client communication, police interrogation practices, contract
disputes, legal discourse, defamation, trademark infringement,
courtroom interpretation and translation, copyright disputes,
discrimination, commercial warning messages, and various types of
criminal charges such as perjury, bribery, solicitation, money
laundering, threatening, and fraud. Virtually all of such cases involve

5.

See The Science of Linguistics, supra note 2 ("[A]s other scientists, [linguists] formulate

hypotheses, catalog observations, and work to support explanatory theories.").
6. Studying Linguistics, LINGUISTIC SOC'Y AM., http://www.linguisticsociety.org/resource/
studying-linguistics (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).

7. See id.
8. Linguistics as a Profession, LINGUISTIC Soc'Y AM., http://www.linguisticsociety.org/
resource/linguistics-profession (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
9. SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA
82 (Lawrence M. Solan et al. eds., 2015); see PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 51-69 (1999).
10. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-6 (2005); see LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS
AND THEIR INTERPRETATIONS 5, 9-13 (2010).
11. See discussion infra Parts I-IX.
12. See infra note 15. See generally Leonard, supra note 4.
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written or spoken language evidence, making linguistic analysis
very relevant. 13
In contract disputes, the meaning of individual words and phrases
(as well as syntactic relations) can form issues of contention.14 In
plagiarism cases, which are a subset of authorship analyses, the question
is whether the text or content was lifted by a defendant from an author's
or company's document (e.g., a novel, judicial opinion, screenplay, or
patent application) onto another document without proper citation and
passed off as the defendant's own. In copyright cases, the linguistic
issues can include not only straightforward borrowing of words but also
copied discourse structure such as topic sequencing." In a related area of
the law, trademark infringement cases regularly turn on linguistic
similarities between a junior and a senior trademark (e.g., phonological
analysis can demonstrate whether they sound similar, and semantic and
pragmatic analysis can elucidate whether their meanings are similar.16
Even in cases of product liability, linguists can offer important
testimony, for example, showing that the product had an insufficient,
incomprehensible, or unreadable warning label). Roger W. Shuy of
Georgetown University has demonstrated in several cases that while the
usage instructions on a product were written clearly and precisely, the
warning sections were imprecise, unclear, and ambiguous. 1 Other types
of cases in which linguistic analysis can be pivotal are discrimination
and defamation cases where a defendant's language use can be subjected
to scrutiny, for example, regarding its meaning in context.
The courts recognize the validity of the field of forensic linguistics
and allow experts to offer testimony." The field is applicable to a wide
range of cases and situations.20 Yet, regardless of its already extensive

13. Roger W. Shuy, Language and the Law, in THE HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS (Mark
Aronoff & Janie Rees-Miller eds., 2d ed. forthcoming May 2017).
14. Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 859, 879-83 (2004).
15. ROGER W. SHuY, FIGHTING OVER WORDS: LANGUAGE AND CIVIL LAW CASES 133-41
(2008).
16. ROGER W. SHUY, LINGUISTIC BATTLES IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES 23 (2002); Shuy, supra
note 13.

17. Roger W. Shuy, Warning Labels: Language, Law, and Comprehensibility, 65 AM.
SPEECH 291, 301-02 (1990).
18.

SHUY, supra note 15, at 133-41; ROGER W. SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF DEFAMATION

CASES 34 (2010).
19. See infra notes 20, 85.
20. A wide range of cases in which linguistic experts had testified or consulted are described
and analyzed in scores of books such as those written by Roger Shuy, a pioneer of the field and the
foremost forensic linguist in the United States. See generally ROGER W. SHUY, BUREAUCRATIC
LANGUAGE IN GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS (1998) [hereinafter SHUY, BUREAUCRATIC
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use, forensic linguistics is still an underutilized tool; it can be applied to
virtually any case in which language could be considered evidence, and
that of course covers many more cases than those in which it has
presently been used.2 1
This Article focuses on criminal cases, presenting six examples in
which language is important evidence, each case highlighting a different
aspect of forensic linguistic analysis. The first case demonstrates the
intelligence that can be harvested from close analysis of an author's
writing (or a person's spoken language). 22 The next two are authorship
cases in which testimony or consultation for the prosecution sought to
aid the jury in deciding whether the defendants authored certain
documents.23 An analogous type of case follows, in which the hope of
the defense was a mitigation of the death penalty.24 The final two are
potential exoneration cases.25

LANGUAGE]; SHUY, supra note 15; SHUY, supra note 16; SHUY, supra note 3; SPEAKING OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA, supranote 9; ROGER W.
SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF BRIBERY CASES (2013) [hereinafter SHUY, BRIBERY CASES]; ROGER W.
SHUY, THE LANGUAGE OF CONFESSION, INTERROGATION, AND DECEPTION (1998) [hereinafter
SHUY, CONFESSION, INTERROGATION, AND DECEPTION]; SHUY, supra note 18; ROGER W. SHUY,
THE LANGUAGE OF FRAUD CASES (2015) [SHUY, FRAUD CASES]; ROGER W. SHUY, THE
LANGUAGE OF MURDER CASES (2014) [hereinafter SHUY, MURDER CASES]; ROGER W. SHUY, THE
LANGUAGE OF PERIURY CASES (2011) [hereinafter SHUY, PERJURY CASES]; ROGER W. SHUY, THE
LANGUAGE OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (2012) [hereinafter SHUY, SEXUAL MISCONDUCT

CASES]. Shuy has consulted or testified at trial in over 500 cases in the past thirty-five years and
published numerous books on various aspects of language and the law. See ROGER W. SHUY,
http://www.rogershuy.com (last visited Apr. 10, 2017); Academic Experience - Forensic Books,

ROGER W. SHurY, http://www.rogershuy.com/ae forensic.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). Further,
Shuy is the series editor of Oxford Studies in Language and Law. See SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND
LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA, supra note 9, at ii.
21. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Linguistics as a Knowledge Domain in the Law, 54 DRAKE L.

REV. 651, 659, 666 (2006) (describing the use of linguistics as being increasingly used by litigants,
but underutilized as a doctrinal tool amongst courts). Of course, from the viewpoint of a criminal

defense lawyer, there may be other valuable testimony that a forensic linguist could provide. For
example, supporting an attack on jury instructions for being incomprehensible or supporting a claim
that trial counsel was ineffective to properly prepare the client for an allocution, by failing to assist
the client in presenting his statement as a persuasive narrative. Comparable examples do not lead to
exoneration, but nonetheless, they are very important. Hofstra University's Forensic Linguistics
Capital Case Innocence Project deals with cases not limited to the question of innocence.
See The Institutefor Forensic Linguistics, Threat Assessment, and Strategic Analysis at Hofstra

University, HOFSTRA U., http://www.hofstra.edu/academics/colleges/hclas/cll/linguistics/forensiclinguistic-institute.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Parts IV-VI.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See infra Parts VII-VIII.
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FORENSIC LINGUISTIC PROFILING: UNABOMBER

The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") sketch below and its
behavioral profile of the Unabomber both were famously inaccurate, but
the forensic linguistic profiling was quite accurate.26 The FBI sketch and
a contemporaneous photograph of Theodore Kaczynski, who was
convicted of being the Unabomber, are provided:

Roger Shuy was asked by the FBI to analyze the Unabomber's
notes and manifesto in order to ascertain possible demographic
features.27 Among the linguistic features recognized by Shuy was the
vocabulary present in the notes and letters that accompanied the bombs,
as well as in the Unabomber's later manifesto. 28 For instance, the use
of "learned vocabulary, including words such as surrogate, over
specialization,and tautology,"29 as well as complex grammar, called into
question the belief generally held by the FBI that the bomber was poorly
educated. On the other hand, Shuy noted, the texts would not have been
acceptable in the humanities or social sciences but suggested instead a
background in the natural sciences.30 Other aspects of the vocabulary
placed the writer as someone who had lived in northern California but
probably not all of his life (the texts referred to a type of mountain as
sierras, while other local terms like ranch or mesa were never used).31
Thematically, the manifesto often returned to the concept of sin and used
terms such as God's will, unclean thoughts, and sublimation,32 which
contributed to Shuy's opinion that the bomber had likely had a "religious
26. See Jack Hitt, Words on Trial: Can Linguists Solve Crimes That Stump the Police, NEW
YORKER, July 23, 2012, at 24, 25.
27. ROGER W. SHUY, CREATING LANGUAGE CRIMES: How LAW ENFORCEMENT USES (AND
MISUSES) LANGUAGE 181-82 (2005); SHUY, MURDER CASES, supranote 20, at 75-86.

28. For the text of the 35,000-word manifesto as submitted by the Unabomber, see FC,
Industrial Society and Its Future, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 1995), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/national/longterm/unabomber/manifesto.text.htm.
29. Roger W. Shuy, DARE's Role in Linguistic Profiling,DARE NEWSLETTER (Dictionary of
Am. Reg'l English, Madison, Wis.), Summer 2001, at 1, 4.
30. Id. at 4-5.
3 1. Id. at 4; see SHUY, supranote 27, at 182.
32. See FC, supra note 28.
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upbringing, possibly Catholic."33 A very interesting feature that required
in-depth knowledge of American spelling systems to even recognize was
some consistent spelling variations that matched a spelling reform put
forth by the Chicago Tribune in the 1940s and 1950s, although it had
never widely caught on.34 On this basis Shuy suggested that the writer
was likely from the Chicago area.
When Kaczynski was finally apprehended in April 1996, it was
confirmed that Shuy's analysis had been accurate for the age of the
suspect, his geographic origin, geographic residences, education level,
educational specialization, and religious background."
III.

AUTHORSHIP ANALYSIS CASES

Authorship cases involve anonymous or pseudonymic documents,
the authorship of which is questioned ("questioned document"). Forensic
linguists are retained as experts to compare questioned documents with
documents of known authorship ("known documents")-i.e., known to
have been produced by one or more suspects. The linguistic analysis
aims to discern patterns indicating whether a hypothesis of common
authorship better explains the data than hypothesizing independent
authorship.36 To investigate the data, linguists may examine features
such as follows:
* dialect;
* underlying native language;
* grammar (e.g., clause embedding, preposition usage, discourse
markers, that complementizer deletion);
* patterns of usage and errors in spelling, mechanics, and
punctuation;
* management of narrative time structures and departures from the
narrative sequence;
* word choice;
* register type (e.g., letter, ransom note, detective novel);
* formality level; and
* peculiarities of style (e.g., parallel structures).

33. Shuy, supranote 29, at 4.
34. Id.
3 5. Id.
36. Robert A. Leonard, CommunicatingLinguistic Theory and Analyses to Judge and Jury in
the Highly Adversarial US. Justice System: TheatricalCross Examinationsvs. the Facts, in LEGAL
DISCOURSE AND COMMUNICATION (Girolamo Tessuto ed., forthcoming 2017); Robert A. Leonard,
ForensicLinguistics, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL CRIMINOLOGY: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIES

AND ISSUES (Vincent B. Van Hasselt & M. L. Bourke eds, forthcoming 2017).
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Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used.37 Qualitative
methods are largely inductive and proceed by identifying unusual
features or features that reoccur within or between documents in a nonrandom fashion. Interestingly, our experience has shown that even
writers who seek to conceal their identity by manipulating features of
their language are often unable to control all of these types of features in
a coherent way. For example, if a writer tries to sound less educated than
he actually is, although he may purposely misspell or misuse words, he
may still forget to "dumb down" his punctuation (or, in any event, to a
level commensurate with his manipulated spelling level). Indeed, several
features are typically below the level of consciousness for most language
users-for example, patterns in the use of punctuation such as hyphens
or apostrophes, the number of spaces one leaves after a period and the
beginning of the next sentence, the grouping of topics, or the structure of
narrative events.
Qualitative analyses are complemented by quantitative wherever
relevant. Variant patterns can be measured within the questioned and
known documents themselves and then compared to the distribution of
similar features in comparable text corpora or databases. This can
demonstrate how individualistic certain features are that link the
questioned and known documents.
IV.

HUMMERT "STALKER/SERIAL KILLER" CASE

In Commonwealth v. Hummert,3 8 two very different types of
language patterns were identified that, through close linguistic analyses,
propelled investigation and provided crucial evidence for the
prosecution. Brian Hummert of York, Pennsylvania, had received letters
written by an alleged stalker that threatened his wife, Charlene
Hummert, and accused her of infidelity.39 She was later found strangled
in her own vehicle in a parking lot.40 The police suspected Mr. Hummert
and charged him with the murder.41 While he was under scrutiny, the
press and the police received a letter from a person claiming to be the
murderer-a self-confessed serial killer who stated that Mrs. Hummert

37. Jo Angouri, Quantitative, Qualitative or Both? Combining Research Methods in
Linguistic Research, in RESEARCH METHODS INLINGUISTIcs 29, 31-34 (Lia Litosseliti ed., 2010).
38. No. 1549 MDA 2012, 2013 WL 11253455 (Pa. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2013).
39. Id at *3; see Brief of Appellee, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania at 3, Commonwealth v.
Hummert, No. 2195 MDA 2006 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 2, 2007).
40. Hummert,2013 WL 11253455, at *2.
41. Id. at *1.
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had been his lover; that she had wanted to break off the affair; and, as a
result, he had killed her, making her his fifth murder victim. 42
At this point, the Pennsylvania State Police Criminal Investigation
Assessment Unit decided they needed expert advice and retained Robert
Leonard Associates to perform a forensic linguistic analysis of the
questioned documents (the "stalker letter" and the "serial killer
letter").43 The serial killer letter appeared to be a post-offense
manipulation of investigation communication ("POMIC").4 A POMIC

is an after-the-fact "red herring" communication, typically intended to
divert suspicion from a prime suspect to some other real or fictional
person.4 5 Commonly, a POMIC combines disinformation with specific
information that is not publically known but would be known to the
perpetrator. This was also the case here. The serial killer letter provided
details about where the victim was murdered and how she was dragged
from her house to her car, thus explaining the presence of small pieces of
driveway gravel in the skin of her lower back-gravel that was shown to
originate from the Hummert driveway.46 Yet, at the same time, the letter
falsely claimed that the strangulation instrument was a "white nylon
rope" instead of the red dog leash the police had retrieved from the
Hummert residence. 4
There were obvious differences between the questioned documents,
such as length, formality, and grammar. The stalker letter was lengthy,
typewritten, and used complex syntax. The serial killer letter was short,
handwritten, and almost exclusively composed of simple main clauses. It
contained several grammatical "mistakes," later judged to be attempted
obfuscations, camouflaging language characteristics. But the letters also
shared features such as well-executed, complex narrative patterns and,
importantly, an unusual rhetorical device: repeating the same verb in two
consecutive sentences and changing the context to express irony and
cruel humor. This device was rare enough that experts in rhetoric who
were consulted had no ready label for it. The stalker letter stated the
writer had slept with Mrs. Hummert and, referencing rumors of her
further sexual proclivities, wrote, "I would have loved to have found out.
42.

See Brief of Appellee, supra note 39, at 3-4; Hummert Letters, ROBERT LEONARD

ASSOCIATES, http://www.robertleonardassociates.corn/PDF/NewYorker iPadextra.pdf (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017).
43. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 39, at 4; Hummert Letters, supra note 42.
44. This is a term and acronym used by the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit. James R.
Fitzgerald,

The FBI's Communicated Threat Assessment Database: History, Design, and

Implementation, FBI L. ENF'T BULL., Feb. 2007, at 6, 8.
45. See id.
46.
47.

Compare Hummert, 2013 WL 11253455 at *3, with Hummert Letters, supranote 42.
Hummert Letters, supra note 42.
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A couple of days later she made sure my fianc6e found out. She dumped
me and then had an abortion." In the serial killer letter: "I killed
Charlene Hummert, not her husband. We had an affair for the past nine
months. She wanted to break it off. So I broke her neck!" 4 8 The linguists
termed this device "ironic repetition." Eventually, this analysis
contributed to obtaining a search warrant for Mr. Hummert's computer
and office, a search that produced a quantity of work-related e-mails and
other documents written by him (known documents). Detailed analysis
revealed an unusual, but consistent, pattern of contraction that linked the
questioned and known documents. In both sets of documents, positive
verbs were never contracted (e.g., "I am" never contracted to "I'm")
while negated verbs varied between occurring in contracted and noncontracted versions (e.g., both "do not" and "don't" appeared). Corpus
linguistic searches of similar word strings confirmed that this pattern
was highly unusual. Thus, the superior hypothesis was that the linguistic
patterns in the questioned documents were best explained as being
instances of the linguistic patterns in the known documents, known to
have been written by the chief suspect, Brian Hummert. Several other
forensic experts also testified, and Mr. Hummert was convicted.
V.

COLEMAN TRIPLE HOMICIDE

People v. Coleman49 proves the advantage of having access to
specialized corpora such as the FBI's Communicated Threat Assessment
Database ("CTAD").so Christopher Coleman, bodyguard to a wealthy
fundamentalist television preacher, received a series of death threats
against himself and his family that displayed intimate knowledge of their
whereabouts. Despite newly installed surveillance equipment, he went to
the gym one morning and, unable to reach his wife on the phone, called
the detective who lived across the street to check on them. The detective
went and found the defendant's wife and two little boys strangled in
their beds."1 Importantly, spray-painted messages at the murder scene
reprised the language of the previously communicated threats.52
Police discovered that Coleman had been having an affair with a
friend of his wife.53 As one magazine headline pithily asked: "Could a

48. Id.
49. 24 N.E.3d 373 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
50. For additional discussion on the CTAD, see Fitzgerald, supranote 44, at 6-9.
51. Coleman, 24 N.E.3d at 379-82.
52. Id. at 379-82, 395-96.
53. Id. at 379.
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father strangle his wife and young sons just to keep a high salary and a
sexy mistress? And if not, who did?"S 4
A computer forensics expert testified that the emails had come from
Coleman's work computer.5 ' That was one strong link of the threatening
messages to Coleman. But the defense argued that it merely showed
the message had been sent from his computer, not Coleman himself
writing: "The defense pointed out that 6 people had log-on id's for
that computer."5 6
The testimony provided by co-author Robert A. Leonard not only
tied together all the threats but also linked the linguistic patterns in the
threats to the linguistic patterns of Coleman. In other words, the forensic
linguistic analysis tested two sets of hypotheses. The first dealt with just
the questioned documents (i.e., the threats and the spray-painted
messages) and whether their linguistic features indicated common
authorship. While a series of linguistic features linked together the
threats and the murder scene spray-painted messages, a particularly
interesting feature linking all the questioned documents was the presence
of the obscenity "fuck" to begin both the threats and spray-painted
messages. This obscenity might not strike one as an unusual feature in
criminal communications, but a search of the CTAD showed its
placement to be highly unusual. The analysis showed that of over 4400
criminal documents in the CTAD, only 18 (.4%) began with the word,
and of those, only 8 (less than .2%) contained overt threats." A very rare
feature, but one shared by all the questioned documents.
The second analysis compared the questioned to the known
documents and identified a range of features linking the two sets, among
them a pattern of spelling "you" as "U" and a frequent pattern of fused
spelling confusion (e.g., in a questioned document, "[h]ave a goodtime,"
and, in the known documents, "spend sometime together" and "to feel in
anyway obligated"). In short, the following hypotheses were found to be
superior to others: (1) that each of the questioned documents shared
similarities that could be traced to a single author and (2) that the
questioned documents and known documents also shared similarities
that were consistent with a single author. The defendant was

54. Jeannette Cooperman, A Family Erased: The Chris Coleman Story, ST. LoUIS MAG. (July
22, 2011, 2:44 PM), https://www.stlmag.com/A-Family-Erased-The-Chris-Coleman-Story.
55. Prosecution Rests Case in Coleman Triple Murder Trial, KMOV.cOM (Mar. 13, 2015,
7:07 AM), http://www.kmov.com/story/28449153/prosecution-rests-case-in-coleman-triple-murdertrial.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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found guilty due to "overwhelming" circumstantial evidence, from
linguistics and several other forensic fields."
VI.

PAVATr AND ANDREW

A habeas death penalty case argued that James Pavatt, sentenced to
death for murder, should be spared execution because he had been under
the "substantial control" of his accomplice Brenda Andrew, who wielded
enough power over him to compel him to write a confession that
inculpated him and exculpated her. 9
The background of the case was that Andrew had taken Pavatt as
a lover, and Pavatt then sold a large insurance policy to Andrew's
husband, whom the two lovers killed.60 At trial, Andrew produced
Pavatt's handwritten, signed confession.6 1 In the confession, he claimed
full, and sole, responsibility.62 The confession was discounted, and both
were found guilty and sentenced to death.63
Leonard was asked by the federal public defender whether the
confession could be analyzed to determine whether it contained
language that was Andrew's as opposed to Pavatt's, as this would be
evidence that she had dictated at least some of the confession to Pavatt.
This, in turn, would show that the confession was not his own
spontaneous product.64 Leonard and his colleague Dr. Benji Wald
analyzed the grammar; punctuation; spelling; lexical choice; formality
level; genre of language; word, sentence, and paragraph structure; and
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic features of the confession; and
compared it to the known writings of Pavatt and Andrew.
Here the challenge was to bifurcate double authorship from one
document. This can pose significant challenges when both putative
authors share many demographic characteristics because such authors
tend to share similar linguistic features. It proved possible, through an
examination of complementary grammatical systems. That is, analysis of
the known documents of each defendant revealed that although they
58. Joel Christie, Court Upholds Life Sentence for Televangelist's Bodyguard Who Strangled
His Family to Death While They Slept After Starting an Affair with His Wife's Childhood Friend,
DAILY MAIL (Jan. 4, 2015, 10:09 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2895728/Courtupholds-life-sentence-televangelist-s-bodyguard-strangled-family-death-slept-starting-affair-wife-schildhood-friend.html#ixzz3qVW9mlQC.
59. See Pavatt v. Trammell, No. CIV-08-470-R, 2014 WL 1745019, at *15-16 (W.D. Okla.
May 1, 2014).
60. Id. at *5.
61. Id. at *88-89.
62. See id. at *15-16.
63. See id. at *1.
64. Id. at *60.
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indeed shared many features, there was one systemic feature
characterizing Andrew's language patterns that was not present in
Pavatt's language patterns. Whenever Andrew used a construction with
what are called "conjoined subjects," she would follow standard
grammar rules and use personal pronouns in the subjective (nominative)
case (e.g., "the woman and I went" or "Lisa and he talked"). Conversely,
Pavatt would only use the objective case pronoun (e.g., "the woman and
me went" or "Lisa and him talked").65 It is very common in English, as
in other languages with similar grammatical systems, that people vary
between the two case forms, correlating with the formality of the
context. In more formal writings, people typically adhere more strongly
to norms of spelling and grammar (e.g., "the woman and I went").66 But
Pavatt always used the non-standard, "and me" pattern-even in the
most formal of contexts (e.g., in a letter to his attorney, Pavatt wrote,
"The young lady says Andrew and me should talk"). Pavatt does not
exhibit that he ever commands the standard "and I" pattern. The
confession letter had only the "and I" pattern, thus matching Andrew's
grammar but not Pavatt's, regardless of the fact that the letter was in
his handwriting.
The following two cases are ones in which forensic linguistic
analyses were requested in an attempt to exonerate the convicted.67 In
this area, too, forensic linguistics has been underutilized. While DNA
tests have successfully proven many wrongfully convicted defendants to
be innocent, many possible exoneration cases involve no DNA samples.
But, often, there is crucial language evidence.
VII.

ANTWAUN CUBIE

In 1996, at the age of eighteen, Antwaun Cubie allegedly shot and
killed his friend in a Chicago neighborhood." Three years later, he
received a life sentence.69 An important piece of evidence brought to
bear in his trial was a two-page, typed confession with Cubie's signature
below.7 0 Cubie claimed not to have given either a voluntary or coerced
confession-indeed, he claimed not to have given a confession at all,
denying that he dictated or in any other way authored what was called
65. Declaration Under Penalty of Perjury of Robert A. Leonard, Pavatt v. Sirmons, No. 5:08cv-00470-R, 2009 WL 8542774, at *2-7 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 14, 2009).
66. See id at *3-4.
67. See infra Parts VII-VIII.
68.

Art Barnum, Man Gets Life in Student's Murder, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 29, 1999), http://

articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-04-29/news/9904290316-1_penalty-oak-park-shooting.
69. Id.
70. See id.
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his confession. 7 1 He asserted that he was severely beaten, interrogated,
and then told to sign blank forms in order to make a phone call. The next
time Cubie saw those forms, he said they contained a concocted
confession typed over his signatures. 72 The government maintained that
73
Cubie dictated the confession, which was transcribed word-for-word.
Accordingly, a detective involved in the matter had testified as follows:

Q. And as to the statements being written down, were police reports
drafted that memorialized each and every one of these words?

A.

Yes. 74

Thus, the competing hypotheses to test were that the language
patterns of the questioned confession were better explained as being
instances (1) of the language patterns of Cubie's known writings or
(2) of other than the language patterns of Cubie's known writings.
Leonard and Hofstra University interns compared the questioned
confession document with the known documents of Cubie and also
examined the language data obtained from possible government authors,
notably the detective quoted above.
The analysis revealed five notable features of the questioned
confession document: (1) use of then in structuring narratives; (2) use of
complementizers; (3) variation in the contraction patterns; (4) inclusion
of features of formality, dialect, and formal police register; and (5) use
of discourse markers.
These features in the confession do not resemble Cubie's writings.
For example, the phrase at an unknown time: the confession has Cubie
saying, "I met Jeremy at Cass Avenue and 63rd Street in Westmont at an
unknown time on Saturday the 1st of June." 76 Given the research that has
been done on American dialects, one must assess a low likelihood

71.

Art Barnum, Ex-Prep Basketball Star Convicted in Death, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 1999),

72.

See Barnum, Ex-Prep Basketball Star Convicted, supranote 71.

2 0084
1_fatal-shooting-face-trial-cookhttp://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-03-27/news/9903 7
Star
Convicted]; Art Barnum, Trial Starts in
Basketball
Ex-Prep
county-jury [hereinafter Barnum,
3-Year-Old Murder Case, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 24, 1999), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1999-0324/news/9903240177_1_trial-oak-park-school-year [hereinafter Barnum, TrialStarts].

73. Letter from Robert A. Leonard to the Ill. Torture Inquiry & Relief Comm'n (Nov. 18,
2016) (on file with author) (providing support for Cubie).
74. Transcript of Record at E187-88, People v. Cubie, No. 96 CR 15758 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 26,
1999); see Letter from Robert A. Leonard to the Ill. Torture Inquiry & Relief Comm'n, supra note
73.
75. Letter from Robert A. Leonard to the Ill. Torture Inquiry & Relief Comm'n, supra note
73.
76. Id.
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of eighteen-year-old Cubie spontaneously generating the phrase at an
unknown time.77
Regarding the patterns of use of then, the confession had a number
of sentences in which then followed the subject-for example, "I then
told Jeremy to move his jeep to the end of the alley" and "[w]e both
then went into the building after ringing Jamie's bell."78 Note that
then followed the subjects I and we.79 The detective used the same
construction in his testimony: "[a]ll three then went out to the front"
and "[h]e then walked away and put- and dumped the handgun into
a garbage can that was down the alley."o But in the assembled
known, contemporaneous documents of Cubie, 3256 words long, this
construction cannot be found even once." When Cubie did use then, it
preceded the subject, such as in "[s]o I told him if I get out of my bed
I'm going to kick his ass very well, so then he shut up" and "but then I
said what am I going to write then the little guy inside said write what
you feel inside."82
In sum, the evidence shows that the confession closely resembles
the patterns of language exemplified by the detective's testimony at
Cubie's trial and not the language patterns of Cubie's known writings.
These findings support Cubie's contention that he was not the
author of the questioned confession. The results of the analysis, plus
other apparently exculpatory evidence, are at the present time before the
Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission.8
VIII.

BYRON CASE

The analysis of language evidence in State v. Case84 relied heavily
on what linguists call pragmatics, which, in brief, brings knowledge of
the situational context to bear on the interpretation of all parts of a text.
Important tools are conversation analysis (how turns-at-talk are
distributed among the participants)" and speech act analysis (and
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Letter from Robert Olmstead, Exec. Dir., Ill. Torture Inquiry & Relief Comm'n, to Robert
A. Leonard (Aug. 31, 2016) (on file with author).
84. 140 S.W.3d 80, 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
85. Pragmatic analysis has proven useful in both civil and criminal cases of many kinds. For
example, Leonard testified in a U.S. district court in Florida on the contextual meaning of words
claimed as trademarks and in state court in Florida on the meaning of internal company-related
communications; in state courts in New Jersey, Arizona, and Nevada on the meaning of language
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especially whether the intended meaning differs from the explicitly
expressed meaning. 86
In 1997, Anastasia WitbolsFeugen was found shot in a Missouri
cemetery after a night of driving around with her boyfriend and another
couple.8 7 The boyfriend, Justin Bruton, was found two days later, having
taken his own life by shotgun, some miles away." The surviving couple,
Kelly Moffett and Byron Case, initially gave corroborating accounts that
WitbolsFeugen had stormed off after getting into an argument with
Bruton, and they dropped Bruton off at his own house.89
Three years later, Moffet accused Case of WitbolsFeugen's
murder. 90 Based on her new testimony against him-now claiming
to have seen Case shoot WitbolsFeugen-and an audio recording that
she made of one of their phone calls containing a so-called "tacit
admission," Case was eventually tried and convicted of WitbolsFeugen's
murder. 9' In Missouri, a tacit admission is one in which an accusation is
not overtly denied. 92 On the government transcript, Moffet asks Case,
"Why did you have to kill her?" and is met by silence. 93 She continues,
"So, I mean, if you could seriously explain to me as to why you actually
felt the need to kill her then that would really help me feel better about
the whole fucking thing. I mean, was there seriously any reason for all of
95
this?" 94 to which Case responds, "We shouldn't talk about this." This
claimed to be confessions, in Montana on the meaning of language claimed to be a suicide
communication, and in Michigan on the meaning of a conversation claimed to be a solicitation to
murder; and in Paris before the World Bank on the meaning of an English-language bilateral trade
agreement between Turkey and Turkmenistan. Co-author Tanya Karoli Christensen testified in
Glostrup, Denmark, in a city court case brought against a so-called Syrian warrior, where pragmatic

analysis supported the prosecution's contention that the veiled language of chat messages detailed
the defendant's plans to return to Syria and ISIS.
86. Take, for example, the following transcript excerpt, in which the question, "How's
David?" was deemed evidence of a threat; a prosecution ensued:

Tyner: How's David?
Hyde: You mean my son?
Tyner: Yep.
Hyde: Don, don't you threaten my son. Do a lot of thing but don't ever threaten my son.

Tyner: I didn't threaten anybody. I just said, "How's David?"
ROGER W. SHUY, LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE

COURTROOM 109 (1996). Shuy walks through this case and notes: "As usual, the context of the
conversations gives many clues to their meaning, which the words alone may not make clear to later
listeners, such as juries. Id. at 104-11.
87. Case, 140 S.W.3d at 83.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 94 (affirming conviction).
92. See, e.g., State v. Merrill, 846 S.W.2d 225, 228-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
93. Case, 140 S.W.3d at 84.
94. Id.
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last sentence was cited by a reviewing judge in upholding Case's
sentence. But the actual circumstances of that call are far more
complicated. After a detailed analysis was undertaken by Leonard and
Hofstra University interns, it was evident that the quality of the
recording was poor and exacerbated by Moffett's breathing heavily into
the phone, static, and background noises. There were places in the
conversation where Case was clearly speaking but not being heard, such
as follows:
14:36 Moffett: I can be there. I know how to drive a stick shift now.
[laughter]
14:39 Case: [inaudible]
14:40 Moffett: I know.

14:42 Case: [unintelligible] true [unintelligible]
14:46 Moffett: [laughter] Above him?
14:49 Case: Yeah.96
Thus, even if Case had overtly denied killing WitbolsFeugen in
the section in which it is claimed he made his tacit admission, the
denial might well not have been audible on the recording. There are
also several other problems with the interpretation of the conversation
as a tacit admission, which present themselves when the conversation
is examined turn-by-turn. The linguists further conducted an analysis
of Moffet's new inculpating testimony against Case, comparing both
Moffet's and Case's original accounts of the murder and Moffet's
varying accounts to each other.
Close analysis of Moffet's and Case's original accounts of the night
of the murder demonstrated that the narratives were in agreement on
virtually every detail, but not so similar as to suggest collusion and
rehearsal (i.e., they were not so close as to demonstrate a single script).97
Moreover, and importantly, these original accounts were consistent with
all externally established facts of the case." Moffet's later accounts
accusing Case, however, were not only inconsistent with the facts of the
case (such as the times of day certain events occurred) but also internally
contradictory from one iteration to the next. 99 Case remains in prison
at this time. His lawyers, from the Midwest Innocence Project, are
mounting a new appeal."oo
95.

Id.

96.

Listen to Kelly's Late-Night 06-05-01 Phone Call to Byron, FREE BYRON CASE, http://

freebyroncase.com/what-went-wrong/index.html#fifth (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
97. Case, 140 S.W.3d at 83.
98. See id at 83-84.
99. Id.
100. See Offender Data of Byron Case, MO. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, https://web.mo.gov/doc/
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CONCLUSION

As these examples demonstrate, in many circumstances, forensic
linguistics offers powerful tools to test the validity of criminal charges
or convictions. As discussed in Part I, forensic linguistics can similarly
serve in civil cases, to support or challenge legal conclusions.
In sum, although forensic linguistics has been used to advantage in
a multiplicity of cases, it is still underutilized in both criminal and civil
matters. As we have argued, forensic linguistic analysis can be of value
in virtually any case in which language can be considered evidence.

offSearchWeb/offenderlnfoAction.do (enter captcha; then search for first name "Byron," last name
"Case") (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
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